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Patents are peculiar legal instruments in that they contain both technical and
legal information. This Janus-like nature of the documents is important because
they serve the legal purpose of affording the owner the right to exclude others from
practicing the invention, and third parties need to be able to assess the scope of
that right. At the same time, through the patent’s disclosure, the document is
intended to contribute to the storehouse of technical knowledge. Superficially,
patents are generally viewed through the eyes of the hypothetical person having
ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA), patent law’s “reasonable person.”
Unfortunately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has marginalized
the PHOSITA by treating the document, particularly in claim construction and in
assessing the sufficiency of the patent’s disclosure, as a purely legal document.
While this shift is understandable, it is also unfortunate. Possible justifications for
the court’s move are unpersuasive. For instance, from the ex ante perspective, the
court may hope to encourage future applicants to provide better disclosures. As
this Article explains, that argument fails because the court’s legal standards are
too vague and the lapse of time between the application and a competitor’s review
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of the patent causes informational asymmetries for which the applicant cannot
account. From an ex post perspective, this shift may assist lay judges and juries in
evaluating patents, but such a result is the problem—this treatment reduces the
technical value of the patent and incentivizes future applicants to treat the
disclosure in a legal fashion, not as a technical resource.
To balance the interest in public notice with the technical nature of the patent,
this Article posits the use of presumptions. Courts should use the intrinsic
evidence—the patent and the prosecution history—to generate a presumptive
conclusion as to the construction of the patent or the sufficiency of the patent’s
disclosure. Then, the court should resort to the extrinsic evidence to determine
whether the legalistic conclusion reached should be rejected in light of the
understanding of technologists in the relevant field. In this way, the default position
for courts is interpretation afforded by the intrinsic record, enhancing public
notice. This default, however, can be rebutted when facts regarding the technical
import of the document are brought to bear, bringing the viewpoint of the
PHOSITA into the calculus.
INTRODUCTION
Patents are peculiar legal instruments. A patent affords a patent owner the right
to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the
invention.1 The scope of these exclusive rights is determined by the patent’s claims,
single-sentence elaborations of the invention found at the end of the patent.2 It
therefore is a legal document as it sets the metes and bounds of the owner’s
exclusionary rights.
Yet, a patent is far more than a legal document like a contract or will. The patent
must contain enough information to allow a person of ordinary skill in the relevant
technology to make and use the invention.3 Moreover, the patent claims often
contain technical language that would be unintelligible to a non–technically trained
lawyer.4 Patents, therefore, are also technical documents, containing information of
interest to technologists and scientists. In fact, one of the key purposes of the patent
system is to enhance the storehouse of technical knowledge, leading to further
innovation.5

1. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2.
3. Id. ¶ 1. See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539,
545–47 (2009) [hereinafter Fromer, Patent Disclosure]; Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in
Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 127–31 (2006) [hereinafter Holbrook, Possession];
Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1142–59 (2008); Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in
the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 127, 129–31 (2008) [hereinafter Seymore,
Heightened Enablement].
4. See generally Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 9–17
(2010) (describing district court judges’ struggles with technology aspects of patent law).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) (“An
inventor deprives the public of nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery, but gives
something of value to the community by adding to the sum of human knowledge.”). But see
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As a result of patents’ Janus-like nature, reading and interpreting them can be
challenging, as courts must parse both the legal and the technical to arrive at a
conclusion about the scope and validity of the patent. To mediate a patent’s dual
nature, the patent statute and common law have developed an analog to tort law’s
“reasonable person”: the “person having ordinary skill in the art,”6 generally
referred to as the PHOSITA.7 In almost every area of patent law, the court or jury
should view the issues from the perspective of the PHOSITA, not that of a lawyer
or layperson. Consequently, the description in a patent need not include
information already known by the PHOSITA, which permits applicants to submit
simpler patent disclosures.8 Similarly, other patentability requirements, such as
novelty9 and non-obviousness,10 are assessed through a technically based
perspective.11 Whether a given device infringes a patent is also determined by
considering the perspective of the PHOSITA.12 The PHOSITA, whoever she may
be, is ubiquitous in patent law.
Within the judicial system, however, no one is truly a PHOSITA. Patent
litigation cases are tried in front of judges and juries who seldom have technical
degrees at all, let alone one relevant to the particular patent at issue. Even at the
national court of appeals that hears all cases arising under the patent laws, the U.S.
Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV.
2007, 2023–26 (2005) (rejecting the view that patent disclosures disseminate technical
knowledge).
6. 35 U.S.C. §§ 103, 112; Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S.
17, 37 (1997) (comparing tort’s “reasonable person” to patent law’s person skilled in the art).
7. See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?,
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1185–90 (2002); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy
Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1648–51 (2003); Jonathan J. Darrow, The
Neglected Dimension of Patent Law’s PHOSITA Standard, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 227
(2009); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the
Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885 (2004); Joseph P. Meara, Just Who Is
the Person Having Ordinary Skill the Art? Patent Law’s Mysterious Personage, 77 WASH. L.
REV. 267 (2002); John O. Tresansky, PHOSITA—The Ubiquitous and Enigmatic Person in
Patent Law, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 37, 37–38 (1991).
8. See, e.g., Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730
F.2d 1452, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1984). But see ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., LLC, 603 F.3d
935, 941 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
9. An invention must be new in order to be patented. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–02. The
absence of novelty results in the claimed invention being anticipated. See, e.g., Lewmar
Marine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F.2d 744, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See generally Timothy R.
Holbrook, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: Implications of Pfaff v.
Wells Electronics, Inc. and the Quest for Predictability in the On-Sale Bar, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 933, 936–37 (2000); Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60
DUKE L.J. 919, 930–37 (2010).
10. 35 U.S.C. § 103; Holbrook, supra note 9, at 937.
11. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256–57 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(concluding that the level of ordinary skill was determinative of obviousness); see also
Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 8–9 (2009) [hereinafter Holbrook, Paradox] (discussing the relationship between
disclosure and PHOSITA).
12. Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1361 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Darrow, supra note 7, at 236; Holbrook, Paradox, supra note 11, at 21–27.
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Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,13 most of the judges are not technically
trained or did not have prior patent experience.14 The PHOSITA construct, rooted
in the scientific or technical, can be difficult for the courts to apply.
Unsurprisingly, the Federal Circuit over time has discounted the role of the
PHOSITA.15 In reviewing the patent document, the court has emphasized the
document itself and the relevant patent’s prosecution history, the public record of
the patent application process at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO or
PTO).16 If this publicly available intrinsic evidence is clear, the court will refuse to
consult other extrinsic evidence, which would be where the technological context
of the invention would be revealed. The court favors the intrinsic evidence as a
mechanism for enhancing public notice.17 The intrinsic evidence is accessible to all
parties and is not subject to the influence of the litigation process. By emphasizing
the patent document in isolation, the Federal Circuit has increasingly viewed
patents as merely legal, not technical, texts.18 To effect this approach, the court has
articulated a variety of formalistic legal rules19 that are far more accessible to a

13. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). See generally Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation
Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
14. Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1068–69 (2003). Of the judges currently on the
Federal Circuit, five have technical backgrounds and/or had patent experience prior to
joining the bench: Judges Newman, Lourie, Gajarsa, Linn, and Moore. See UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov (follow “The
Court: Judges” hyperlink). Judge Rader served on the Senate Subcommittee that dealt with
intellectual property policy issues. See id. Judge O’Malley, while not having a technical
degree, does have considerable experience as a district court judge trying patent cases. See
id. Judge Dyk and nominee Edward DuMont litigated patent cases prior to their
appointments. See, e.g., TiVo, Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 516 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (nominee DuMont), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, No. 2009-1374, 2010 WL
1948577 (Fed. Cir. May 14, 2010); Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d
1553 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Judge Dyk). The final pending nominee, Jimmie V. Reyna, has
neither a technical degree nor patent litigation experience. See Jimmy V. Reyna,
WILLIAMSMULLEN, http://www.williamsmullen.com/jreyna. He does have extensive
international trade experience, over which the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction. In contrast,
examiners at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office do have technical backgrounds. See
PAT.
&
TRADEMARK
OFF.,
Patent
Examiner
Positions,
U.S.
http://usptocareers.gov/Pages/PEPositions/Default.aspx.
15. Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 889–97 (discussing the marginalization of PHOSITA in
the obviousness context).
16. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc).
17. See Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 51, 79–82 (2010).
18. Cf. Markman, 52 F.3d at 978–79 (“Moreover, competitors should be able to rest
assured . . . that a judge, trained in the law, will similarly analyze the text of the patent and
its associated public record and apply the established rules of construction, and in that way
arrive at the true and consistent scope of the patent owner’s rights to be given legal effect.”).
19. See John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 609, 611 (2009); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity in
Federal Circuit Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 2 (2003)
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layperson but minimize the importance of the patent’s technical component.20 Thus,
while paying lip service to her continued importance, the Federal Circuit has
actually attempted to speak the death of the PHOSITA.
In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court believes that the reports of the PHOSITA’s
death are greatly exaggerated.21 In the context of assessing whether an invention
claimed in a patent is non-obvious, and thus worthy of patent protection, the
Supreme Court recently breathed new life into the PHOSITA.22 Elsewhere, the
Supreme Court has rejected the Federal Circuit’s formalism in favor of more
flexible procedural rules. In particular, the Supreme Court has offered a variety of
presumption-based rules that balance interests in certainty and fairness.23
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has not taken these lessons to heart with respect
to its treatment of the patent document itself.
Patent scholarship has failed to take full account of the Federal Circuit’s
systemic efforts to emasculate the PHOSITA in the context of the patent document
itself. This Article fills this gap in the literature by performing a comprehensive
review of the manner in which the Federal Circuit has marginalized the
PHOSITA’s role as it relates to the patent document, particularly in the manner the
court construes patent claims and assesses the sufficiency of patent disclosures,
generally known as the written description and enablement requirements.24 The
Article posits that the removal of the PHOSITA’s viewpoint of the patent document
is unfortunate because it transforms the patent inappropriately into a purely legal
document, when in fact that patent is a blend of the technical and the legal. This
shift has the unintended result of undermining the disclosure function of the patent
system.
In response to this problem, this Article offers a novel methodology to balance
the Federal Circuit’s interest in certainty with the important consideration of the
technical aspects of the patent document. I posit that the use of rebuttable
presumptions can balance the interest in certainty with an appropriate place for the
PHOSITA. Presumptions allow the court to establish a default position that reflects
its policy preference, here preferring reliance on the patent document and public
record over extrinsic, technological evidence. Unlike the status quo, however, the
intrinsic evidence is not necessarily determinative; the presumptive outcome from
consideration of the intrinsic evidence can be rebutted by persuasive technologybased evidence. Absent such evidence, the intrinsic evidence would govern the
outcome. In this way, courts would afford primacy to the patent document while
still providing the opportunity for the views of the PHOSITA to be considered in
the inquiry.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I.A explores the nature
of the patent document, detailing how it is both legal and technical in nature. In
[hereinafter Holbrook, Complicity]; Nard, supra note 17, at 77–99; Rai, supra note 14, at
1103–22; John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 792
(2003).
20. See Lee, supra note 4, at 29−41.
21. With all respect due to Mark Twain.
22. See infra Part II.A.
23. See infra Part II.A.
24. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc).
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subpart B, I elaborate the Federal Circuit’s inappropriate discounting of the
PHOSITA in the context of claim construction and the requirements for an
adequate patent disclosure. Subpart C then considers potential justifications for the
Federal Circuit’s approach by considering its ex ante and ex post consequences.
From the ex ante perspective, the Federal Circuit could be attempting to create a
penalty default that encourages more robust disclosures from patent applicants. The
temporal dynamic of the patent system, however, creates various information
asymmetries that suggest the court will not achieve this goal. From the ex post
perspective, the court could apply a heuristic to aid laypersons in engaging with
patent law. This rationalization, however, is the problem: the removal of the
technical components of the disclosure from its appropriate place in the patent
document. Ultimately I reject these possible defenses of the Federal Circuit’s
approach.
Part II.A then considers the contrasting approach of the Supreme Court in
balancing the concerns of certainty and fairness. In particular, I explore how the
Supreme Court has both emphasized the role of the PHOSITA and preferred the
use of presumptions to balance the potential competing interests of public notice
and fairness. Subpart B then explores the theoretical aspects of presumptions and
concludes that such a methodology meshes well with the patent law fabric. Subpart
C then offers a particularized rebuttable presumption framework for addressing the
construction of patent claims and for assessing the adequacy of the patent’s
disclosure. Subpart D finally considers possible limitations and drawbacks to the
presumption methodology. Notwithstanding some potential hurdles, I conclude that
the use of rebuttable presumptions provides an effective method for balancing the
legal aspect of the patent document with the technical, improving public notice for
the patent system.
I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S ELEVATION OF THE PATENT DISCLOSURE
AND D ISCOUNTING OF THE PHOSITA
Almost every doctrine in patent law is tethered to the PHOSITA in some
fashion. In large part, the reliance on the PHOSITA is necessary given the nature of
the patent document, which has both legal and technical aspects. The Federal
Circuit, however, has elevated the legal aspect to preeminence, relegating the
technical aspect—and the PHOSITA—to second-class status. The court’s embrace
of formalistic legal rules that focus strictly on the patent document is tied directly
to its interest in promoting interest and certainty in patent law, but it results in an
over-discounting of the views of technologists, as represented in the PHOSITA
construct. This Part explores the legal and technical nature of patents and the
Federal Circuit’s unsurprising yet unfortunate preference for treating them as
primarily legal documents.
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A. The Janus-Like Nature of the Patent—Technical, Legal, or Both?
Patents are fairly unique forms of property in that they serve a constitutional,
utilitarian purpose: to promote the progress of the useful arts.25 The award of a
patent is therefore about more than simply rewarding the inventor for his creation;
it also benefits the public by publishing the invention in the patent document. In
exchange for the patent, the inventor is obligated to disclose how to make and use
the claimed invention.26 As a result, while the patent is undeniably a legal
document (it affords the patentee the right to exclude others from practicing her
invention), it is also a technical document (it teaches technical details of the
invention to the relevant public).27
The legal aspect of the patent becomes apparent when construing the patent’s
claims. In patent law, the scope of the right to exclude afforded by the patent is
determined by the patent’s claims.28 A claim acts as the metaphorical “fence” that
determines the scope of the patentee right.29 The claim, therefore, is the essential
feature of the patent used to assess both validity30 and infringement.31 For
determining infringement and validity of the claims, therefore, one must determine
the meaning of the language in the claim.32 The act of interpreting the claims
therefore delineates the legal limits of the right to exclude.
Even a cursory perusal of a patent on a simple technology confirms that these
documents also contain technical information. For example, a patent that covers the
insulating sleeve on paper coffee cups contains the summary of the invention:
This invention provides recyclable, corrugated containers and container
holders which can be made from existing cellulosic materials, such as

25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See generally Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied
Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint
on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119 (discussing the Constitutional purpose and limits of
the Patent and Copyright Clause); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent
Clause: Are There Limits on the United States’ Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 1, 4–21 (2004) (discussing potential Constitutional limits on patent law).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006).
27. Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621,
624 (2010) [hereinafter Seymore, Teaching Function]; FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 4, at
3–4 (2003).
28. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention.”).
29. See Holbrook, Paradox, supra note 11, at 8–9.
30. Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (noting that validity is determined on a claim-by-claim basis).
31. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (noting that infringement is assessed on a claim-by-claim basis).
32. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Dana Corp.
v. Am. Axle & Mfg., 279 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[A] court may not invalidate
the claims of a patent without construing the disputed limitations of the claims and applying
them to the allegedly invalidating acts.”).
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paper. The preferred recyclable, corrugated hot beverage container
includes a lip and an internal cavity for containing a hot or cold
medium. The container includes fluting means, such as fluting
adhesively attached to one or more liners, for thermally spacing the
hands of the user from the harsh temperatures of the contents of the
container.33
Even a patent on the relatively straightforward insulating sleeve is rife with
technical jargon. Far more complex technologies of course involve far more
technical disclosures.34 Thus, it is unsurprising that in order to prosecute patents at
the USPTO, a patent attorney or agent must have a qualifying technical degree.35
Patent examiners at the USPTO also are required to have technical degrees.36 As a
result, patents necessarily involve technical information.
Review of the literature on patent disclosures confirms that patents are a
somewhat bizarre mix of the technical and legal, with commentators advocating a
myriad of preferences for one or the other. For example, Professor Sean Seymore
argues that the patent document should take on an even more technical character,
bridging the gap between patents and more traditional forms of scientific
publication and making the patent document a more effectual teacher to
technologists.37 In his view, the patent document at present is undervalued as a
source of technical information. The legalistic “patentese” undermines the
document’s effectiveness as a technical disclosure yet does little seemingly to
enhance its legal nature.38 Instead of treating a patent increasingly as a purely legal
document, he argues that it should take on a greater technical nature by, for
example, requiring working embodiments of the invention.39

33. U.S. Patent No. 5,205,473 col.1 ll.44–52 (issued Apr. 27, 1993).
34. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,716,827 col.2 ll.41–57 (issued Feb. 10, 1998).
Methods resulting in the isolation of substantially homogenous compositions of
human hematopoietic stem cells are provided. The methods employ a
predetermined separation regimen and bioassays for establishing the generation
of each of the hematopoietic lineages from the isolated cells. The human stem
cells find use: (1) in regenerating the hematopoietic system of a host deficient
in stem cells, (2) in a host that is diseased and can be treated by removal of
bone marrow, isolation of stem cells and treatment of individuals with drugs or
irradiation prior to re-engraftment of stem cells, (3) producing various
hematopoietic cells, (4) detecting and evaluating growth factors relevant to
stem cell self-regeneration; (5) the development of hematopoietic cell lineages
and assaying for factors associated with hematopoietic development; and (6)
treatment of genetic diseases through gene replacement in autologous stem
cells.
Id.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

37 C.F.R. § 11.7.
See supra note 14.
Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 27, at 641–57.
Id. at 633–41.
Id. at 641–46.
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Similarly, Professor Jeanne Fromer has expressly noted that the patent document
has two audiences, the technical and the legal.40 Notwithstanding her belief that
patents represent the best source of technical information,41 she recognizes that
many technologists do not read the patent disclosure due to the “legalized
jargon.”42 Similar to Professor Seymore, she advocates an enhanced role for the
patent document and would separate the technical from the legal to better effect the
disclosure function of patents.43
Professor Joseph Miller also has advocated enhancing the technical component
of the patent document to improve the interpretation of patents.44 As he explains,
“augmenting the patentee’s technological disclosure with carefully selected
contextualizing information should help courts more reliably identify disputed
claim terms’ technologically proper meanings.”45 Professor Miller would create a
strong default position based on the ordinary meaning of a term in the relevant art.
He proposes that the USPTO require not only the enhanced technical disclosures
but also particularized definitions of key relevant terms.46
In contrast, Professor John Golden has advocated a partial retreat from viewing
the patent as a technical document in favor of recognizing its more legal nature.47
At least with respect to the interpretation of a patent’s claims, Professor Golden
advocates for an approach that expressly considers the view of a patent attorney,
not merely the PHOSITA.48 Thus he would emphasize the legal nature of the
document, informed in part by relevant technological considerations.
Patents themselves, the law, and the literature all confirm that the nature of the
patent document is a strange mix of the legal and the technical. Of course, the
entity with the most authority in regulating the dichotomous nature of the patent
document is primarily a legal actor: the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, which hears all patent appeals arising under the United States’ patent
laws.49 As a result, the court has shifted the emphasis of the patent toward the legal
and away from the technical.

40. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, supra note 3, at 543.
41. Id. at 560 (“By process of elimination, the patent document is the principal way for
an interested technologist to locate useful information about a patented invention.”). But see
Holbrook, Possession, supra note 3, at 143–46 (arguing that patents are a poor source of
technical information due to limits on use and delays in publication).
42. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, supra note 3, at 560–61.
43. Id. at 563–85.
44. Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful Claim Construction,
9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 177, 187–88 (2005).
45. Id. at 188.
46. Id. at 203–07.
47. John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their “Interpretive
Community”: A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321,
327 (2008).
48. Id. at 383–85.
49. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(1), 1338(a) (2006).
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B. The Federal Circuit’s Treatment of the Patent as Legal
for Purposes of Public Notice
Patents, unlike tangible property, do have a problem: their inchoate nature
renders defining the boundaries of the property right difficult.50 Indeed, scholars
have decried the lack of public notice as one of the significant failings of the patent
system.51 The Federal Circuit has long recognized the need for certainty and public
notice in the patent system.52 As a result, the court has tended to adopt somewhat
formalistic, bright-line legal rules in various areas of patent doctrine.53 This interest
in public notice, though, begs the question of notice as to whom?54 Who is the
relevant public? Unsurprisingly, as a judicial and legal actor, the Federal Circuit
has generally directed its efforts at public notice to lawyers, elevating the patent
document and public record as a legal instrument and marginalizing its technical
component, in essence by removing the PHOSITA from active participation in the
resolution of certain issues.55 This dynamic is particularly apparent in the Federal

50. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1748–61 (2009) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley,
Fence Posts]; Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek
Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 365 (2000); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes
Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107
MICH. L. REV. 223, 227–29 (2008). Because an invention may be something new, it may be
difficult to find words to adequately capture the idea, further compounding the boundary
delineation problem. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
731 (2002); Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. Rev. 719, 737,
755 (2009).
51. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46−72 (2008); Craig Allen Nard, A
Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 12–14 (2000).
52. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (discussing uncertainty surrounding court’s standard for patent-eligible subject
matter), aff’d, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards,
Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1046–47 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (discussing need for certainty in the on-sale
bar); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 586 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (en banc) (discussing reliance on public record to effect public notice), vacated &
remanded, 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455–56
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (discussing need for certainty in claim construction).
53. See, e.g., Electromotive Div. of Gen. Motors Corp. v. Transp. Sys. Div. of Gen.
Elec., 417 F.3d 1203, 1214–15 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (elevating two out of thirteen factors, control
and customer awareness, as necessary to find experimental use). See generally Holbrook,
Complicity, supra note 19, at 2–3; Thomas, supra note 19, at 781–83.
54. There is a dearth in the literature about patent law’s audience. See generally Mark
D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience(s) (Jan. 11, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
55. See, e.g., Group One, 254 F.3d at 1047 (setting standard for “on-sale bar” under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) as formal commercial offer as defined by contract law). But see Timothy R.
Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale”: Assessing Patent Infringement for Offering to
Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-Sale Patentability Bar and Other Forms of
Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 782–83 (2003) (arguing standard is wrong
because it is directed to lawyers, not technologists).
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Circuit’s jurisprudence in two key areas: the interpretation of a patent claim and the
sufficiency of a patent’s disclosure.56
1. The Primacy of the Patent Document and
Prosecution History in Claim Construction
The determination of the scope of a patent depends upon the interpretation of the
patent’s claims, which informs both infringement and validity analyses. Disputes
over the patent claims, therefore, are central in nearly every patent case.57 Because
claims are actually abstract representations of the invention, they are rife with
uncertainty.58 Considerable effort in litigation is therefore devoted to the process of
claim construction.59 The baseline principle for interpreting a word in a claim is
that its meaning is assessed not from a lay perspective, but instead from that of the
PHOSITA, giving the term its ordinary and customary meaning in the art.60 A
patent applicant can act as her own lexicographer, however, affording a term with a
definition different from its customary one.61 Both of these assessments are taken
from the perspective of the PHOSITA.62 One would think, therefore, that an
important part of the interpretive process would be evaluating how a technologist in
the field would interpret the term.
The Federal Circuit, however, has marginalized greatly the role of the
PHOSITA in construing patent claims. In construing a claim, the Federal Circuit
requires a court to first consider the intrinsic evidence, which consists of the claims
themselves (both asserted and unasserted), the specification, and the prosecution
history (which is the record of the application process at the USPTO), all of which
are in the public domain.63 Only if this evidence is ambiguous is it appropriate to
resort to extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries, prior art not in the prosecution
history, treatises, experts, and the inventor.64
By creating this preference for the intrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit hopes
to promote public notice.65 The evidence considered most relevant is that readily

56. Admittedly, these two doctrines can be related, as the scope of the disclosure
informs the appropriate scope of the claims. See generally Holbrook, Paradox, supra note
11, at 8–15.
57. See Burk & Lemley, Fence Posts, supra note 50, at 1750.
58. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731
(2002) (“[T]he nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a
patent application.”); BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 51, at 56–61; Burk & Lemley, Fence
Posts, supra note 50, at 1751–61.
59. See generally KIMBERLY A. MOORE, PAUL R. MICHEL & TIMOTHY R. HOLBROOK,
PATENT LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 322–23 (3d ed. 2008).
60. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
61. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
62. Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. LifeScan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
63. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583; Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978–79 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
64. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584.
65. Id. at 1583 (“[C]ompetitors are entitled to review the public record, apply the
established rules of claim construction, ascertain the scope of the patentee’s claimed
invention and, thus, design around the claimed invention. Allowing the public record to be
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available to any member of the public. As the patent is theoretically a selfcontained document, with sufficient information in the specification to practice the
invention, the resort to extrinsic evidence would seem inappropriate.66 The problem
is, however, that federal judges—even those on the Federal Circuit—are not
persons of ordinary skill in the art. They are lawyers, not technologists.67 While the
Federal Circuit has noted that extrinsic evidence may be taken to educate the
judge,68 the court has made clear that it is error to rely on such evidence if the
intrinsic evidence is unambiguous.69 The court rejected one methodology that
would have given substantial consideration to dictionaries, which could provide
insight as to the ordinary meaning of a term from the perspective of the
PHOSITA.70 Unsurprisingly, the focus on the more legal, intrinsic evidence would
be favored by those trained in the law and not necessarily in the sciences.71

altered or changed by extrinsic evidence introduced at trial, such as expert testimony, would
make this right meaningless.” (citation omitted)).
66. Markman, 52 F.3d at 978 (“The patent is a fully integrated written instrument.”).
67. See supra note 14.
68. Markman, 52 F.3d at 980–81; Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. In Pitney Bowes, Inc. v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., the court clarified Vitronics by explaining:
Despite the district court’s statements to the contrary, Vitronics does not
prohibit courts from examining extrinsic evidence, even when the patent
document is itself clear. Moreover, Vitronics does not set forth any rules
regarding the admissibility of expert testimony into evidence. Certainly, there
are no prohibitions in Vitronics on courts hearing evidence from experts.
Rather, Vitronics merely warned courts not to rely on extrinsic evidence in
claim construction to contradict the meaning of claims discernible from
thoughtful examination of the claims, the written description, and the
prosecution history—the intrinsic evidence.
182 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citations and footnote omitted).
69. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584.
70. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1320–22 (rejecting the methodology of Tex. Digital Sys., Inc.
v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
71. The Federal Circuit appears ready to reconsider its standard of review for claim
construction. See, e.g., Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1350–51
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (now-Chief Judge Rader criticizing the de novo standard of review); Amgen
Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc) (declining en
banc reconsideration of de novo review with several dissents and concurrences); see also
Trading Techs., 595 F.3d at 1363–64 (Clark, J., concurring) (district court judge sitting by
designation, criticizing de novo review). Prior to recent judges taking senior status or
retiring, there seemed to be a sufficient number of judges willing to reconsider the issue en
banc. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 59, at 261 (counting number of Federal Circuit judges
willing to reconsider the de novo standard). With Judges Schall and Mayer taking senior
status in 2009 and 2010, respectively, and Judge Michel retiring altogether in 2010, the
ability of the court to reconsider the issue en banc will depend on the new judges. Federal
Circuit Judge O’Malley, a former district court judge, has criticized the de novo standard.
See Kathleen M. O’Malley, Patti Saris & Ronald H. Whyte, A Panel Discussion: Claim
Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 680
(2004) (Judge O’Malley stated, “If we are going to receive evidence from experts in order to
determine those things, it is a hard pill to swallow as a district judge that, after seeing the
experts, and hearing the experts, our efforts to answer those questions are subject to a
completely de novo review and a blank record. It is difficult to accept that there is no
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Moreover, the court has taken to using representations made in the specification
against the patentee.72 A patentee is free to be her own lexicographer, providing
unique definitions to words that vary from the customary and ordinary meaning in
the relevant technological art.73 Such a rule is not troubling when the patent
applicant has offered an express definition of the term: she knows that the public
will rely on that definition and not some other found outside of the patent
document.74 The problem arises, however, when the Federal Circuit concludes that
the patentee has implicitly provided a definition, which generally arises in the
specification when the applicant distinguishes earlier technologies from the claimed
invention75 or provides only one version of the patented invention.76 In this context,
the court has nevertheless concluded that the applicant has surrendered subject
matter, in essence provided a definition implicitly about what the invention is not.77
The court finds this surrender, however, without considering whether the
PHOSITA would read the same language as giving up subject matter; instead, the
court is applying a legal idea—estoppel—to preclude the patentee from obtaining
coverage for something that she gave up from the perspective of a lawyer.78
The Federal Circuit effectively has jettisoned the perspective of the PHOSITA
from the claim construction analysis.79 Moreover, as claim construction is usually
dispositive of literal infringement,80 absent factual issues about the device or
deference given to that factual decision making.” (emphasis in original)).
Even if the Federal Circuit changes the standard of review, however, it will not
eliminate the problem if the court persists in giving primacy to the intrinsic evidence. Indeed,
it is quite possible that deference to the factual extrinsic evidence will not alter the oftcriticized reversal rates because, on appeal, the court can simply rely on the intrinsic
evidence, to be reviewed de novo anyway, and ignore extrinsic evidence if it is inconsistent
with the intrinsic evidence. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 997–98 (Mayer, J., concurring)
(arguing for contract-like analysis, with intrinsic evidence treated as legal and extrinsic
evidence as factual).
72. See, e.g., CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir.
2002); SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1345–
47 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
73. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582.
74. See, e.g., Trading Techs., 595 F.3d at 1353.
75. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (“[T]he specification may reveal an intentional
disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim scope by the inventor. In that instance as well, the
inventor has dictated the correct claim scope, and the inventor’s intention, as expressed in
the specification, is regarded as dispositive.”); SciMed, 242 F.3d at 1345–47.
76. See, e.g., Nystrom v. TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1143–46 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(construing term “board” as limited to boards made of wood).
77. See Miller, supra note 44, at 205–06 (recognizing and criticizing such implied
definitions).
78. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim
Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123, 142 (2005) [hereinafter Holbrook, Claim
Construction].
79. See Holbrook, Possession, supra note 3, at 160.
80. Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 103 F.3d 978, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Where
the parties do not dispute any relevant facts regarding the accused product . . . but disagree
over possible claim interpretations, the question of literal infringement collapses into claim
construction and is amenable to summary judgment.”); see also Jeanne C. Fromer,
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method accused of infringing the patent, the court has also removed the PHOSITA
from the literal infringement inquiry as well.
2. The Written Description Requirement Replaces the PHOSITA’s Judgment
With That of the Judge
Claim construction is not the only area in which the Federal Circuit has
marginalized the PHOSITA to the point of near irrelevance. More recently, and far
more greatly underappreciated in the literature, the Federal Circuit has removed
considerations of the PHOSITA from assessing the sufficiency of patent
disclosures under the written description and enablement doctrines.81 This assault
on the technical is particularly egregious in this context because it directly threatens
the types of disclosures that patent drafters will make in crafting the application. If
the courts treat the specification as legal, then drafters will have incentives to
reduce the technical aspect of the document in favor of creating a more legalistic
text.82
In exchange for the grant of a patent’s exclusive rights, a patentee must disclose
her invention to the public. The courts view the quid pro quo aspect of patents as
crucial because it forces the applicant to disclose information about the invention to
the public.83 The disclosure obligations are governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1,
which states in relevant part:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same . . . .84
Contained within this somewhat opaque language are two requirements according
to the Federal Circuit: the patent must contain a written description of the invention
and information sufficient to enable the PHOSITA to make and use the invention.85
Importantly, in contrast to the law of claim construction and infringement, the
statute specifically references the importance of the PHOSITA by referencing “any
person skilled in the art.” Notwithstanding this express statutory provision, the
Federal Circuit over time has minimized the importance of the PHOSITA in the
area of patent disclosures.
This trend of elevating the disclosure over the knowledge of the PHOSITA has
its genesis in the law of written description, the dispute over which has been much
discussed in the case law and literature.86 The written description historically and

Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1469−72 (2010).
81. See infra notes 86–159 and accompanying text.
82. See Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 27, at 633–41.
83. Holbrook, Possession, supra note 3, at 131–32.
84. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006).
85. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc). But see id. at 1369 (Linn, J., dissenting).
86. For case law, see, e.g., LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336,
1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Wallach, 378 F.3d 1330, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Regents of the
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uncontroversially acted to prohibit an applicant from adding new matter to the
patent application.87 Applicants cannot supplement an application with new
material without forfeiting the benefit of an earlier filing date.88 If an earlier-filed
application contains sufficient support for material found in a later application, then
the applicant is entitled to priority of the earlier application, potentially permitting
her to avoid invalidating prior art.89 To show adequate support, the specification of
the earlier application must demonstrate that the inventor possessed the subject
matter claimed in the later application.90 Similarly, within a given application, the
doctrine acted to constrain an applicant’s attempts to amend a claim that would
effectively add new matter to that application.91 In that context, the amended claim
would be invalid as improperly adding new matter to the application. Thus, the
written description requirement “functions to ensure that all claims amended or

Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See also Univ. of Rochester
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1307–08 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, J., dissenting from
declination of en banc consideration) (“In 1997, this court for the first time applied the written
description language of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 as a general disclosure requirement in place of
enablement, rather than in its traditional role as a doctrine to prevent applicants from adding new
inventions to an older disclosure. . . . Neither Eli Lilly nor this case has explained either the legal
basis for this new validity requirement or the standard for ‘adequate support.”’); id. at 1325–27
(Linn, J., dissenting from declining rehearing en banc). For commentary, see, e.g., Duane M.
Linstrom, Spontaneous Mutation: A Sudden Change in the Evolution of the Written Description
Requirement as it Applies to Genetic Patents, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 947, 970 (2003); Janice M.
Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to Biotechnological
Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 617 (1998) [hereinafter Mueller, Evolving Application];
Harris A. Pitlick, The Mutation on the Description Requirement Gene, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 209, 222–23 (1998); Harold C. Wegner, When a Written Description Is Not a “Written
Description”: When Enzo Says It’s Not, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 271, 274 (2002); Jennifer L. Davis,
Comment, The Test of Primary Cloning: A New Approach to the Written Description Requirement
in Biotechnological Patents, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 469, 487–88 (2004).
87. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“To
obtain the benefit of the filing date of a parent application, the claims of the later-filed
application must be supported by the written description in the parent ‘in sufficient detail
that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed
invention as of the filing date sought.’”); see also id. at 1342 (Gajarsa, J., concurring)
(“Here, the majority’s opinion demonstrates a good example in applying the written
description in a priority policing context, while leaving invalidity in the capable hands of the
enablement doctrine. Though Ariad makes clear that written description is not confined to
the priority policing context, I continue to believe such confinement, while not statutorily
mandated, streamlines litigation and arguably reconciles some of our written description and
enablement precedent.”); In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 995–96 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (holding that
when an applicant attempts to claim specific chemical compounds which were broadly
disclosed, the question is not enablement, but “whether the specification discloses the
compound . . . specifically, as something [the applicant] actually invented”).
88. 35 U.S.C. §§ 120, 132(a) (2006).
89. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
90. Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“To meet [the written
description] requirement, the disclosure of the earlier application, the parent, must
reasonably convey to one of skill in the art that the inventor possessed the later-claimed
subject matter at the time the parent application was filed.”).
91. In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d at 995–96.
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added after the filing date of the application find adequate ‘support’ in the
originally filed application.”92
In recent years, the Federal Circuit has expanded the doctrine to provide a basis
for invalidating a claim even absent priority or new matter concerns. The inventor
must demonstrate sufficient support in the specification to justify the scope of the
claim by showing that the inventor was in possession of the entirety of the claimed
invention; broad, generic claims tend to be particularly vulnerable to challenge
under the written description doctrine.93 In order to satisfy this aspect of the written
description requirement, an applicant must disclose within the patent document
support to show that the inventor was in possession of the invention, and
particularly the entirety of the broad, generic claim.94 The inventor can do so by,
for example, listing a sufficient number of species to justify protection for an entire
class of inventions or identifying common structural or functional aspects of the
invention that would permit broad generalization and extrapolation as to the scope
of the invention.95 How many disclosed species or functional generalizations are
sufficient is unclear and likely depends on the technology.96
This expanded form of the written description requirement originally arose in
the context of biotechnology inventions.97 In particular, early gene patents claimed
cDNA sequences based not on the DNA structures themselves, but instead on the
proteins coded by those DNA sequences.98 Given the redundancy of the genetic
code, such a claiming technique had the potential to allow one patent to cover
millions of DNA sequences.99 Similarly, claiming “vertebrate” or “mammalian”
cDNA generically was too broad when the patent only disclosed a particular
species’ (rats) cDNA sequence.100 Over time, the Federal Circuit has loosened this
obligation as to biotechnology patents as technology has evolved, allowing, for

92. JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 123 (3d. ed. 2009).
93. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc); LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
94. See LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1346; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
119 F.3d 1559, 1568−69 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
95. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350, 1352−53.
96. Id. at 1351 (“The law must be applied to each invention at the time it enters the
patent process, for each patented advance has a novel relationship with the state of the art
from which it emerges. Thus, we do not try here to predict and adjudicate all the factual
scenarios to which the written description requirement could be applied. Nor do we set out
any bright-line rules governing, for example, the number of species that must be disclosed to
describe a genus claim, as this number necessarily changes with each invention, and it
changes with progress in a field.”).
97. See generally Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written
Description Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615
(1998) (exploring the written description requirement’s unique impact on biotechnology and
characterizing it as a super enablement requirement).
98. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567.
99. Cf. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“A prior art disclosure of the
amino acid sequence of a protein does not necessarily render particular DNA molecules
encoding the protein obvious because the redundancy of the genetic code permits one to
hypothesize an enormous number of DNA sequences coding for the protein.”).
100. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567−68.
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example, claiming in terms of function if one of skill in the art would know the set
of structures that would perform that function.101 Moreover, the court more recently
has applied the requirement outside of the biotech area, including sofa design102
and computer software.103 In Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co.,104
the en banc Federal Circuit confirmed that written description is a separate basis for
invalidating patent claims and made clear that the doctrine applies equally to all
technologies and not specifically to biotech or other, early-stage inventions.105
The use of the written description in this fashion has been harshly criticized,
both by judges on the court and commentators, as a standardless requirement that
effectively grants the Federal Circuit discretion to strike down claims that it simply
believes are too broad, regardless of what someone in the technological field might
think.106 Many view the requirement as redundant of the enablement requirement107
and, indeed, have called it a “super-enablement” requirement,108 although the
Federal Circuit rejected this characterization.109

101. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (adopting PTO
Guideline that “the written description requirement can be met by ‘show[ing] that an invention is
complete by disclosure of sufficiently detailed, relevant identifying characteristics . . . i.e., complete
or partial structure, other physical and/or chemical properties, functional characteristics when
coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between function and structure, or some
combination of such characteristics’” (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting
Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 1, “Written
Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1106 (Jan. 5, 2001))).
102. Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479–80 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
103. LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1343–47 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
104. 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
105. Id. at 1352 (“It also has not just been applied to chemical and biological
inventions.”).
106. See LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (Rader, J., dissenting); Davis, supra note 86, at 487–88 (“[T]he court has not issued
clear and consistent standards.”); Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with
the “Written Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 62–71 (2000); Duane M. Linstrom, Spontaneous Mutation: A
Sudden Change in the Evolution of the Written Description Requirement as It Applies to
Genetic Patents, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 947, 970 (2003) (“[I]t has also left us with even
more uncertainty in the law than before the ruling.”); Mueller, supra note 97, at 617; Pitlick,
supra note 86, at 222; Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing
New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 830–31 (1999); Wegner, supra note 86, at
274. But see Lefstin, supra note 3, at 1215–22.
107. Holbrook, Possession, supra note 3, at 161–63; Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly
Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly
and Its Progeny in the Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 80 (2007) (arguing that
the courts have failed to articulate a standard for compliance with written description which
is distinct from enablement); Wegner, supra note 86, at 271.
108. Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Rader,
J., concurring) (“[T]he only way to distinguish the Lilly rule from enablement is to construe Lilly as
requiring more disclosure than necessary to enable one of skill in the art to make and use the
invention, a ‘super-enablement’ standard.”); Mueller, supra note 97, at 617.
109. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
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What is striking about the development of the court’s written description
jurisprudence is that the court rarely, if ever, ventures outside the four corners of
the patent document to account for the PHOSITA’s perspective.110 By focusing
exclusively on the patent specification only, the court has removed the PHOSITA
from the inquiry, notwithstanding its statements that one determines whether the
written description requirement is satisfied from the perspective of the PHOSITA.
The court does not resort to extrinsic, technical information but instead merely sees
a broad, generic claim, reviews the specification to see how many species or
correlations are disclosed, and then concludes whether the court believes there is
adequate support.
3. The Federal Circuit Has Marginalized the PHOSITA in the Enablement Analysis
While the controversy surrounding the written description requirement has been
well documented in the case law and the literature, culminating in Ariad, the
literature has failed to recognize that the Federal Circuit has subtly remolded
enablement doctrine to be virtually identical to the law of written description.111 As
a result, even in this incredibly fact-intensive inquiry, the court has removed the
viewpoint of the PHOSITA in considering whether the patent adequately enables
the claimed invention.112 This dynamic is particularly striking given the express
statutory mandate in § 112 that enablement must be assessed from the viewpoint of
a person skilled in the art.
The enablement disclosure obligation ensures that others will be able to practice
the invention based strictly on the patent disclosure once the patent expires.
Because the patent is published upon issuance (and indeed many applications are
published after eighteen months),113 the enabling disclosure also serves to enhance
the storehouse of knowledge before the patent expires.114 Others can review the
document and, while unable to practice the invention without the patentee’s
permission, can utilize the information therein to generate further advancements or
improvements.115

banc) (“We also reject the characterization, cited by Ariad, of the court’s written description
doctrine as a ‘super enablement’ standard for chemical and biotechnology inventions.”). The
court has recognized that there is a relationship between the two doctrines. LizardTech, Inc.
v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (observing that
written description and enablement are “closely related” and “usually rise and fall together”).
110. See, e.g., Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1355 (rejecting patentee’s expert testimony as “legally
irrelevant”); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 925–26 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (rejecting patentee’s expert testimony and relying solely on specification to invalidate
the claim).
111. See infra notes 124−59 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 124−59 and accompanying text.
113. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) (2006).
114. See Fromer, Patent Disclosure, supra note 3, at 553; Holbrook, Possession, supra
note 3, at 131; Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 27, at 624; Katherine J. Strandburg,
What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WISC. L. REV.
81, 91.
115. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (explaining that the
information disclosed in the patent adds to the public storehouse of knowledge).

2011]

PATENTS, PRESUMPTIONS, AND PUBLIC NOTICE

797

Historically, the courts recognized that enablement is a highly fact-intensive
inquiry, depending on a variety of factors tied directly to the PHOSITA.116
Specifically, if the PHOSITA can make and use the invention without undue
experimentation, then the claimed invention is enabled.117 By using the perspective
of the PHOSITA, the law did not require an applicant to include information that is
already well known in the art, permitting simplification of the patent document.118
In measuring the sufficiency of the specification, therefore, the courts should take
into account both the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art and the content
of the patent specification.119 As the Federal Circuit has noted, “the artisan’s
knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill gaps,
interpolate between embodiments, and perhaps even extrapolate beyond the
disclosed embodiments, depending upon the predictability of the art.”120 Some
experimentation, therefore, does not preclude a conclusion that the claimed
invention is enabled.121 The courts have identified a number of factors relevant to
assessing whether any experimentation would be undue:
1) the quantity of experimentation necessary,
2) the amount of direction or guidance presented,
3) the presence or absence of working examples,
4) the nature of the invention,
5) the state of the prior art,
6) the relative skill of those in the art,
7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and
8) the breadth of the claims.122
While the enablement requirement is conceptually simple, it is a complicated, factintensive inquiry. Further adding to the doctrine’s complexity, it is an ever-moving
target: as the knowledge of the PHOSITA grows over time, an identical disclosure
may shift from not being enabled to being enabled.123
Although the Federal Circuit has highlighted that the assessment of enablement
must include both the knowledge of one of skill in the art and the patent’s
specification, recent cases have elevated the role of the specification and sharply
discounted the importance of the PHOSITA’s knowledge. Beginning in Genentech,

116. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736–37 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
117. Id.
118. Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452,
1463 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
119. Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The scope of enablement, in turn, is that which is disclosed in the
specification plus the scope of what would be known to one of ordinary skill in the art
without undue experimentation.”).
120. AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
121. Wands, 858 F.2d at 736–37.
122. Id. at 737.
123. Holbrook, Possession, supra note 3, at 129–30; see also Holbrook, Paradox, supra
note 11, at 41–42 (discussing how knowledge of PHOSITA alters scope of enablement).
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Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S,124 the Federal Circuit bemoaned the dearth of disclosure
in the relevant specification:
It is true, as Genentech argues, that a specification need not disclose
what is well known in the art. However, that general, oft-repeated
statement is merely a rule of supplementation, not a substitute for a
basic enabling disclosure. It means that the omission of minor details
does not cause a specification to fail to meet the enablement
requirement. However, when there is no disclosure of any specific
starting material or of any of the conditions under which a process can
be carried out, undue experimentation is required; there is a failure to
meet the enablement requirement that cannot be rectified by asserting
that all the disclosure related to the process is within the skill of the art.
It is the specification, not the knowledge of one skilled in the art, that
must supply the novel aspects of an invention in order to constitute
adequate enablement. This specification provides only a starting point,
a direction for further research.125
This statement, however, goes too far. Nowhere in § 112 is there a separate
obligation to disclose the “novel aspects” of the invention: the statute mandates
only that the specification enable the claimed invention to one skilled in the art.126
If one so skilled does not need the “novel aspects” of the invention (whatever those
may be) in order to practice the invention, then seemingly there is no obligation to
disclose it.
This emphasis on the disclosure, and the discounting of the knowledge of the
PHOSITA, has continued. For example, in AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac and Ugine,127
the Federal Circuit confronted the situation where the specification taught away
from a particular embodiment. The court reasoned that:
The question more precisely here is whether, with AK Steel’s patent
specification as an initial guide, the hypothetical skilled artisan’s
knowledge of the surrounding art and ability to modestly experiment
would have been sufficient to enable him to make and use a steel strip
containing a Type 1 aluminum coating, with the claimed wetting
attributes, at the time of the ’549 patent’s effective filing date in 1986.
We conclude that the specification is inadequate as a matter of law
in that regard primarily because it expressly teaches against it. Worse
than being silent as to that aspect of the invention, the specification
clearly and strongly warns that such an embodiment would not wet
well. In particular, the specification warns that silicon content above
0.5% in the aluminum coating causes coating problems. Such a

124. 108 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
125. Id. at 1366 (citation omitted).
126. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006) (“The specification shall contain a written
description . . . of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
127. 344 F.3d 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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statement discourages experimentation with coatings having more than
0.5% silicon, undue or otherwise. It tells the public that higher amounts
of silicon will not work. Nothing further need be said about the
matter.128
Subsequently applying AK Steel, the Federal Circuit in Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v.
Medrad, Inc.129 invalidated a generic claim that covered two embodiments of an
invention when the specification disparaged one of those forms.130 Specifically, the
claim at issue covered both jacketed and jacketless syringes, and the specification
had suggested problems with jacketless embodiments. As a result, the court held
that “where the specification teaches against a purported aspect of an invention,
such a teaching ‘is itself evidence that at least a significant amount of
experimentation would have been necessary to practice the claimed invention.’”131
In both Liebel-Flarsheim and AK Steel, the court did turn to extrinsic evidence to
adduce whether one of skill in the art could make and use the claimed invention,
that is, to decide whether the submitted evidence was sufficient to rebut the
teaching away from the specification.132 Neither rested its conclusion entirely on
the specification.
More recent cases, however, portend a greater shift away from the knowledge of
the PHOSITA and towards requiring disclosure of information in the specification
that is already known to the PHOSITA. In particular, in Automotive Technologies
International, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc.,133 the court noted that:
ATI argues that despite this limited disclosure, the knowledge of one
skilled in the art was sufficient to supply the missing information. We
do not agree. In Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361,
1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997), we stated: “It is the specification, not the
knowledge of one skilled in the art, that must supply the novel aspects
of an invention in order to constitute adequate enablement.” Although
the knowledge of one skilled in the art is indeed relevant, the novel
aspect of an invention must be enabled in the patent. The novel aspect
of this invention is using a velocity-type sensor for side impact
sensing.134
The court has continued this line of reasoning in more recent cases. The court in
Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC135 relied upon lack of enablement to invalidate a
generic claim on summary judgment.136 The invention allowed a user to integrate

128.
129.
130.
131.
2003)).
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 1244.
481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1379.
Id. (quoting AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir.
See Liebel-Flarsheim, 481 F.3d at 1379−80; AK Steel, 344 F.3d at 1244–45.
501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1283.
516 F.3d 993 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1002.
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her own video or audio stream into a video game.137 The district court construed the
claims to be generic, encompassing not only video games but also movies,
notwithstanding that the specification only described video games.138 The Federal
Circuit affirmed the judgment of invalidity for want of enablement on this basis,
noting that “[n]either patent specification in this case teaches how the substitution
and integration of a user image would be accomplished in movies.”139 Only after
reaching this conclusion did the court consider expert testimony proffered by both
parties, relying on the defendant’s expert and rejecting the testimony of the
patentee’s expert as conclusory, unsupported by evidence, and presented by a
person not skilled in the relevant art of film making.140 Such weighing of the
evidence in the context of summary judgment suggests that the court was elevating
the patent disclosure over the extrinsic evidence.
Similarly, the Federal Circuit affirmed a judgment of invalidity for lack of an
enabling disclosure in ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, LLC.141 The
invention involved an extended-release version of a drug used to treat Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).142 The claims were interpreted to cover
both osmotic and non-osmotic versions of the drug, but the specification only
described osmotic forms.143 The court specifically rejected the contention that the
knowledge of the PHOSITA could be used to supplement the patent’s disclosure to
enable the full scope of the claims as construed:
To the extent that ALZA argues that the knowledge of a person of
ordinary skill in the art satisfies the enablement requirement, we
disagree. As this court has repeatedly stated, “the rule that a
specification need not disclose what is well known in the art is ‘merely
a rule of supplementation, not a substitute for a basic enabling
disclosure.’” To satisfy the plain language of § 112, ¶ 1, ALZA was
required to provide an adequate enabling disclosure in the specification;
it cannot simply rely on the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill to
serve as a substitute for the missing information in the specification.144
The court faulted the specification for failing to provide nothing more than a
starting point, thus requiring undue experimentation for the non-osmotic form.145
Although seemingly concluding on the specification alone that the claim was not
enabled, the court did consider the expert testimony offered, rejecting the testimony

137. Id. at 995.
138. Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, No. CV 03-4265-SVW (AJWx), 2006 WL 6116641, at
*4 n.3, *33 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2006).
139. Sitrick, 516 F.3d at 1000.
140. Id. at 1001.
141. 603 F.3d 935 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Sean B. Seymore, Patently Impossible, 64
VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 33−34 n.187).
142. ALZA, 603 F.3d at 936.
143. Id. at 938–39.
144. Id. at 940–41 (emphasis added) (quoting Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am.,
501 F.3d 1274, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2007), and Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d
1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
145. Id. at 941.
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of the patentee’s expert given that it conflicted with other expert testimony and that
his skill level was above that of ordinary skill.146 The court credited the evidence
from the accused infringer that the patentee’s own employees encountered
considerable difficulty in creating a non-osmotic version of the drug.147
The reasoning in Automotive, Sitrick, and ALZA cannot be reconciled with the
language of § 112, ¶ 1. The statute does not create two disclosure obligations, one
for most aspects of the invention and a second for “novel aspects” of the invention.
The only requirement is that a person of ordinary skill be able to make and use the
invention. If an aspect of the invention—even a “novel aspect”—is known in the
art, then the specification need not disclose it.148 The law had been clear that, in
fact, the knowledge of the PHOSITA could supplement the disclosure in the patent,
as per the statutory language.149 The knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art
can fill in such gaps. It is not merely “relevant”: it is determinative of whether a
claim is enabled.150 To suggest otherwise reduces the enablement inquiry into the
identical, inappropriate reasoning used under written description. Neither
Automotive, Sitrick, nor ALZA involved situations where there was no disclosure.
Instead they involved claims that could cover an alternative embodiment that was
not disclosed. There was no evidence to suggest that the particular variations were
somehow essential to the patentability of the invention. The only question should
have been whether one of skill in the art could have made and used the alternatives
covered by the claim without undue experimentation. If one so skilled could have
made an electronic sensor in lieu of a mechanical sensor (Automotive), a movie in
lieu of a video (Sitrick), or a non-osmotic form in lieu of an osmotic form (ALZA),
then the claims should have been enabled. The mere failure to disclose those
alternatives should not per se invalidate those claims absent evidence of the
knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art. The sole inquiry is whether one of
ordinary skill in the art could make and use the invention.
Perversely, this line of cases in the enablement and the written description
doctrines under Ariad now inappropriately conflate infringement with validity. The
reason the scope of the claim becomes relevant is that the claim must be construed
to cover the accused device. If the differences in the accused device were not
present, then validity seemingly would not be at issue. For example, if the device in
Automotive used mechanical sensors, which were disclosed, seemingly there would
not have been an enablement challenge because there would not have been a

146. Id. at 941–42.
147. Id. at 942.
148. If the novel aspect was known to the PHOSITA, then it may suggest the claim is
invalid as lacking novelty or being obvious, but it should have no impact on whether it is
enabled.
149. See Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(“[T]he specification need not necessarily describe how to make and use every embodiment
of the invention ‘because the artisan’s knowledge of the prior art and routine
experimentation can often fill in the gaps.’” (quoting AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344
F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003))).
150. Nat’l Recovery Techs. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
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dispute over whether the patent covered mechanical sensors.151 Yet, the scope of
the claim should not be dependent on the accused device. One wonders whether the
litigants in Automotive, Sitrick, and ALZA could have launched an enablementbased claim even if the accused device was precisely what was disclosed. For
example, if the accused device in Automotive in fact used a mechanical sensor,
could the infringer have made the same enablement challenge? Ultimately, the
court is effectively requiring the specification to enable the accused device and not
the claim.152
Part of the problem is the link between claim construction, claim scope, and
disclosure. As the Federal Circuit noted in Liebel-Flarsheim:
The irony of this situation is that Liebel successfully pressed to have its
claims include a jacketless system, but, having won that battle, it then
had to show that such a claim was fully enabled, a challenge it could
not meet. The motto, “beware of what one asks for,” might be
applicable here.153
The validity of the claim, while clearly tied to claim construction, seemingly should
not be tied to the claim construction arguments. In other words, even if the patentee
had not asked for—nor perhaps needed to ask for—the broader construction, the
claim should be invalid if truly not enabled or unsupported by the written
description.154
This linkage between the claim construction, the accused device, and the
sufficiency of the disclosure is more than ironic, though, because of the asymmetry
between conclusions of noninfringement and invalidity. When there is a judgment
only of noninfringement, the consequences are between only the patentee and that
particular infringer; the patent is still valid, enforceable against other potential
infringers, and available to license.155 With an invalidity determination, however,

151. The same would be true in Sitrick if the accused device was a movie instead of a
video or in ALZA if the accused device was an osmotic form.
152. See Holbrook, Paradox, supra note 11, at 11.
153. Liebel-Flarsheim, 481 F.3d at 1380; see also ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC,
603 F.3d 935, 943 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Automotive Techs. v. BMW of N. Am., 501 F.3d 1274,
1285 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
154. See Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (Rader, J., concurring) (“This case illustrates some of the unintended consequences of
this judge-made doctrine. Each time a claim encompasses more than the preferred
embodiment of the invention described in the specification, a defendant can assert that the
patent is invalid for failure to describe the entire invention. Under the expanded written
description doctrine, every claim construction argument could conceivably give rise to a
validity challenge as well.”).
155. See, e.g., Bayer AG. v. Biovail Corp., 279 F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(addressing enforcement of patent previously found not infringed); see generally Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363, 384 (2001)
(“[F]ailing to resolve the validity issue where raised permits potentially invalid claims to
‘remain in terrorem of the art’ and to serve as a basis for enabling the patent holder to extract
license fees, if not monopoly rents.” (quoting Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, 168
F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1948))).
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the patent is invalid as to the rest of the world, even those not involved in the
litigation.156 Indeed, invalidity judgments have a public-good aspect because third
parties can free ride on an invalidity determination by another without incurring the
costs of litigation.157 Thus, it would seem more appropriate, if we do value patents,
for the courts to err on the side of offering narrower claim constructions that may
result in noninfringement, but nevertheless preserve validity.158 The patentee
should not be punished merely for advocating a legal position. By adopting this
catch-22 approach, the Federal Circuit has created an unwarranted bias against
patents.
Thus, in one of the most fact-intensive inquiries, where the statute mandates the
consideration of the views of the PHOSITA, the Federal Circuit has nonetheless
elevated the disclosure within the patent over the knowledge of the PHOSITA.159
C. Consequences of Treating the Patent as Purely Legal
The Federal Circuit’s marginalization of the PHOSITA seems rather odd given
the mixed nature of the patent document. There might be reasons, however, to
support the Court’s approach. This section weighs the advantages and
disadvantages of the Federal Circuit’s rules. It does so by first looking at the ex
ante consequences: how patent applicants will respond to these rules. This section
explores how the rules could provide advantageous incentives for applicants to
disclose additional information in their patent applications, but ultimately, given
information asymmetries created by the temporal difference between the
application date and the ultimate acts of infringement, concludes that the rules are
too strict and ultimately unwarranted. Second, this section explores the ex post
consequences: what impact these rules will have on the way the courts encounter
and wrestle with these legal issues. Arguably, these legalistic rules minimize the
need for judicial actors to engage with difficult issues of technology; but ultimately,
this abdication of the courts’ role is unsatisfying and results in the courts simply
impeding their ability to deal with these important issues.

156. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971); see
also Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1993).
157. See Cardinal Chem., 508 U.S. at 101 (“As this case demonstrates, the Federal
Circuit’s practice of routinely vacating judgments of validity after finding noninfringement
creates a similar potential for relitigation and imposes ongoing burdens on competitors who
are convinced that a patent has been correctly found invalid.”). See generally Joseph Scott
Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 677–95 (2004).
158. Modine Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
see also Holbrook, Claim Construction, supra note 78, at 144. But see Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“While we have acknowledged the
maxim that claims should be construed to preserve their validity, we have not applied that
principle broadly, and we have certainly not endorsed a regime in which validity analysis is a
regular component of claim construction.”).
159. Cf. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 27, at 653 (“More recently, various
legal actors disagree about whether the enablement analysis should begin inwardly with the
applicant’s disclosure or outwardly by gauging the PHOSITA’s knowledge.”).
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1. Ex Ante Consequences: How Will Future Patent Applicants Respond?
Patent applicants are not a static set. Drafters of applications will respond to the
changing legal and technical landscape. The question is whether the Federal
Circuit’s claim construction and disclosure rules will produce advantageous
consequences for the patent system.
The formalistic claim construction and disclosure rules articulated by the
Federal Circuit could be viewed as information-forcing default penalties. The law
and economics literature has long argued in favor of default rules around which
parties can transact in the absence of normative reasons to use immutable rules.160
In the context of default rules, Professors Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner rejected the
normal assumption that these defaults should reflect the positions to which the
parties would have agreed absent transaction costs.161 Recognizing that parties
often have incentives to behave strategically and not disclose information, Ayres
and Gertner argue for penalty defaults that function to force parties to disclose
information during the negotiation process or risk paying the default penalty.162
The Federal Circuit’s rules, particularly those for written description and
enablement, can be seen as information-forcing penalty defaults. As Professor R.
Polk Wagner has identified, patent applicants have both the incentives and
opportunity to withhold information during the patent application process.163 They
have reasons to provide just enough information to satisfy § 112 and no more so
that the patentee could retain aspects of the invention as a trade secret, potentially
providing a competitive advantage in the market even after the patent is published
or expires.164 Moreover, given the ex parte nature of the application process, there
is no adversarial check on the applicant’s behavior. Only the ethical obligations of
the patent attorney or agent, coupled by the threat of the patent being rendered
unenforceable if the attorney or agent commits inequitable conduct, provide direct
incentives for honesty and disclosure.165 Given this incentive for the applicant to
strategically withhold information, the Federal Circuit’s current rules could be
viewed as penalty defaults to the patentee. If the patentee fails to disclose
information sufficient to support the breadth of the claim they assert in litigation,

160. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87–88 (1989). The literature has suggested
immutable rules are important to protect either parties to the contract who could not
otherwise protect themselves in the negotiation, rooted in parentalism, or parties external to
the contract, rooted in combating externalities. Id. at 88.
161. Id. at 90–91.
162. Id. at 91.
163. R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of
Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 214–16 (2002).
164. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (noting incentive for patent
applicants to write applications “so that they disclose as little useful information as
possible”); Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 27, at 634 n.62.
165. See USPTO Patent Application Rule, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2009) (noting duty of candor
and good faith to the USPTO, including duty to disclose material information). The risk of
eventual invalidation in litigation would constrain strategic efforts, but given that so few
patents reach litigation, that risk would be discounted significantly.
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then the penalty is the invalidation of the claim. Thus, the patent applicant now has
the ex ante incentive to provide a more robust disclosure.166 Because the patent
applicant is in the best position to disclose the relevant information, she should bear
the cost of the failure to disclose.
Unfortunately, this view of the Federal Circuit’s doctrine is overly simplistic
and overlooks some of the important realities of the patent prosecution process.
First, the use of the penalty rule is question begging: part of the problem is that the
court is finding the patent specifications inadequate when, from the viewpoint of
the PHOSITA, they very well may be sufficient. It is possible that some of these
disclosures might be sufficient if one were to consider how a technologist would
view the disclosures. Thus the problem is not the failure to disclose but instead the
failure of the courts to appreciate the disclosure.
Additionally and relatedly, to have effective ex ante consequences, the penalty
default rule needs to be clear for the patent applicant to make an informed decision
of whether to expand her disclosure or to accept the risk of the punishment inherent
in the penalty default. As the literature on written description has discussed, and as
this Article has explained with respect to the Federal Circuit’s recent course on
enablement, these legal standards are vague. It is difficult, if not impossible, for an
applicant to know whether a given disclosure will indeed be sufficient.
There are also temporal aspects to patent law that are more significant than in
Ayres and Gertner’s contract example.167 In contract law, the parties negotiate
contemporaneously with each other to reach an agreement. In patent law, the patent
applicant must attempt to foresee what may happen over the course of the life of
the patent while drafting the application. Once the patent issues, however, that
language is frozen, and the patentee cannot alter it. In contrast, competitors have
the advantage of hindsight, looking at the issued patent and being able to shift their
position in light of the language of the patent, language that the applicant may not
have intended to create the estoppel-like effect as determined by the Federal
Circuit.168 While the patentee seemingly may have the best information about the
invention, the temporal dynamic creates its own information asymmetry and may

166. Cf. Wagner, supra note 163, at 216−17 (arguing for a stronger, almost absolute bar
rule for prosecution history estoppel to force information disclosure during the patent’s
prosecution).
167. This is not to say that contracts do not involve time-related complexities. Contracts
often account for future behavior and may need to be adjusted or interpreted in light of
changed circumstances over time during an ongoing relationship between parties. See
generally Paul J. Gudel, Relational Contract Theory and the Concept of Exchange, 46 BUFF.
L. REV. 763, 765 (1998). Some terms may be left intentionally ambiguous to be addressed at
a later date. See Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and Porous
Boundaries: The Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2164–65
(2010). Nevertheless, the focus on the interpretation of the contract is the intent of the parties
at the time the contract is formed. See, e.g., Centigram Arg., S.A. v. Centigram Inc., 60 F.
Supp. 2d 1003, 1006–07 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
168. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731
(2002) (“Unfortunately, the nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of
a thing in a patent application. The inventor who chooses to patent an invention and disclose
it to the public, rather than exploit it in secret, bears the risk that others will devote their
efforts toward exploiting the limits of the patent’s language . . . .”).
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place potential infringers in a better position to play around the periphery of the
patent.169 This information asymmetry is confirmed by the fact that written
description and enablement challenges in the cases are closely tethered to the
accused device,170 which generally has been created after the patent issued. The
penalty default rule approach assumes a level of foreseeability on the part of a
patent drafter that is unreasonable.
Moreover, to the extent that most of these cases arise from litigation and not
from appeals from the PTO, the court’s articulation of the default penalty is too
late. By the time the litigation reaches the Federal Circuit, the state of the art will
have evolved, particularly in rapidly developing technologies. The rule articulated
by the court, therefore, will be applied to relatively old technologies. Current
applicants will be seeking protection for new technologies. As the written
description and enablement standards are tethered, seemingly, to one of skill in the
art, that skill has now changed. The court articulates the default penalty and
invalidates the patent claim, punishing the litigant and potentially all extant patent
holders who prosecuted their patents under a now invalid disclosure rule, yet those
currently at the PTO would have a different, as of yet unarticulated, disclosure
obligation. We thus punish the current patent holders with no benefit flowing to the
adequacy of current applications’ disclosures. In order to work effectively as a
penalty default, the Federal Circuit would need to articulate the rule in appeals from
the PTO dealing with pending applications. Of course, the only way those appeals
reach the Federal Circuit is if the PTO rejects the applications. If the PTO views the
disclosures as sufficient, under a potentially erroneous standard, the patents will
issue and the standard will not reach the Federal Circuit contemporaneously. The
time lag, therefore, undermines the effectiveness of written description and
enablement as a penalty default.
Finally, it is not clear that the Federal Circuit’s approach is efficient. The law
expressly now requires applicants to disclose that which is already well known in
the art.171 By stating that the knowledge of the PHOSITA cannot supplement the
disclosure as to the novel features of the invention, the Federal Circuit has now
incentivized vast overdisclosure, adding cost to the drafting of patent applications
and costs to the examiners who must examine these more voluminous applications.

169. The doctrine of equivalents could be used to combat the asymmetry, but the Federal
Circuit’s use of the specification in estoppel-like fashion also applies to the doctrine of
equivalents. See, e.g., SciMed Life Sys. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 242 F.3d 1337,
1345–47 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Holbrook, Paradox, supra note 11, at 26–27. If the
patentee has surrendered literal claim scope, then almost invariably she will be precluded
from asserting the doctrine of equivalents; thus, the traditional protection for patentees to
combat the temporal dimension of patent law generally is unavailable to patentees in this
situation. See, e.g., L.B. Plastics, Inc. v. Amerimax Home Prods., Inc., 499 F.3d 1303, 1309
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“We have held that when a specification excludes certain prior art
alternatives from the literal scope of the claims and criticizes those prior art alternatives, the
patentee cannot then use the doctrine of equivalents to capture those alternatives.”).
170. See supra notes 153–59 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 133–50 and accompanying text.
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Given that so few patents are actually litigated172 and that many are valueless,173
increasing the upfront costs of all patent applications seems rather inefficient.
At a minimum, the elevation of the patent document presupposes a level of
foreseeability for a patent drafter that seems rather inappropriate. Competitors will
always have the advantage of hindsight, reading the patent document after the fact
and being able to find flaws in the disclosure that may not have been apparent at
the time of the application, and particularly in light of the competitor’s own
design.174 With the court’s tethering of claim construction and the disclosure
doctrines, patent applicants are at an extreme disadvantage. The likely consequence
is patents of reduced value. Indeed, the Federal Circuit’s assault on scope via the
disclosure doctrines and the removal of the doctrine of equivalents rebuts the
argument that the Federal Circuit is overly pro-patent. Instead, the court is provalidity for patents with narrow scope.
2. Ex Post Consequences of the Federal Circuit’s Rules:
Courts’ Engagement with Technological Facts
Another potential justification for the Federal Circuit’s treatment of the patent
document is ex post in nature, facilitating the ability of courts to deal with patent
issues. By focusing on the public record, the court theoretically is reducing the
various costs associated with reviewing the patent. The court is correct that, as a
self-contained document, review of the patent itself (and the prosecution history)
should be sufficient for third parties to apprise themselves of the scope of the patent
and its teachings.
Along these lines, Professor Peter Lee has argued that these formalistic rules are
not terribly surprising as they operate as heuristics that help lay persons—judges
and juries—avoid having to engage in the complex technologies involved in these
cases.175 Thus the doctrines reduce information costs for judges and juries alike by
transforming the technical concepts into more ordinary, or perhaps more legal,
concepts that are more readily accessible to various judicial actors. The simpler
legal rules “limit[] the degree to which judges must understand technologies and
their context.”176
Unfortunately, this advantage is ultimately its disadvantage: it confirms that the
technical is being ignored in favor of the more familiar legal. As discussed above,
patent drafters will have the incentive to shift the patent document to more of a
legal discussion (assuming they can accurately predict the court’s legal rules),
increasing the gap between patents and other forms of technical knowledge.

172. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1500–08 (2001).
173. See generally Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521
(2005).
174. The use of the specification to preclude claim scope is particularly troubling in
contrast to the use of the prosecution history because the surrender may have been
inadvertent. Holbrook, Claim Construction, supra note 78, at 142–43.
175. Lee, supra note 4, at 25−41.
176. Id. at 41.
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Moreover, if the court’s interest is in promoting notice, it is only promoting
notice to lawyers. Third parties likely have persons skilled in the relevant fields to
assist in assessing the content and scope of patents. Thus, they are more informed
about the patent’s true teachings. Courts, in contrast, are not persons of skill in the
art, and by limiting the relevant evidence, the Federal Circuit is actually
handicapping their understanding.
These harsh formalistic rules that have divorced the PHOSITA from the
analysis, however, are not necessary to afford appropriate weight to the court’s
policy preferences, such as public notice. As the next section shows, the Federal
Circuit should take a cue from the Supreme Court about the importance of the
PHOSITA and her role through the use of rebuttable presumptions.
II. BALANCING THE LEGAL AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL—THE USE OF PRESUMPTIONS
The tension that runs due to the dualistic nature of the patent document is of
considerable concern. The Federal Circuit’s interest in public notice, and
consequent elevation of the patent itself over the PHOSITA, is understandable177
yet troubling. It ignores that documents do contain technical aspects to them, and
that the representations made in them as a technical matter may not have the same
import that the courts are affording them as a legal matter.
Another court has not been as receptive to this approach as the Federal Circuit—
the U.S. Supreme Court. Review of Supreme Court patent jurisprudence counsels
two important points that the Federal Circuit has failed to take into account. First,
the Supreme Court’s recent foray into the law of obviousness demonstrates, and
reinvigorates, the importance of the PHOSITA.178 Second, although the Supreme
Court failed to apply its own methodology in the context of the obviousness
inquiry, the Supreme Court has previously resolved the tension between public
notice and consideration of the technical through the use of presumptions.179
Rebuttable presumptions can be an effective way of mediating concerns of
certainty with the technical aspect of the patent document that necessarily entails
consideration of extrinsic evidence. These presumptions “reflect substantive policy
choices regarding where the risk of error should lie upon completion of the very
uncertain business of fact finding.”180 Here, the policy choice is a preference for the
intrinsic evidence over that of the extrinsic. The default rule, therefore, is that the
intrinsic evidence will govern the determination of issues such as claim
construction and satisfaction of the disclosure obligations. Nevertheless, if
sufficient extrinsic evidence is presented to show that the PHOSITA would not
read the intrinsic evidence in such fashion, then such a presumptive view of the
patent would be rebutted.

177. The Supreme Court has long emphasized the public notice function of a patent. See
McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891) (“The object of the patent law in requiring
the patentee to [distinctly claim his invention] is not only to secure to him all to which he is
entitled, but to apprise the public of what is still open to them.”).
178. See infra notes 183−99 and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 200−21 and accompanying text.
180. David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudication,
88 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 658 (1994).
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This section explores the Supreme Court’s take on the role of the PHOSITA and
the use of presumptions. It then articulates a presumption-based approach to claim
construction and evaluation of the sufficiency of the patent disclosure. By generally
precluding resort to the extrinsic evidence absent some sort of ambiguity, the
Federal Circuit has offered an overly formalistic approach to these issues. The
presumption-based approaches offered here provide a better, more manageable
method for balancing the patent document as a legal and a technical text.
A. The Lessons (and Missed Opportunity) of the Supreme Court’s KSR Decision
For the first twenty years of the Federal Circuit’s existence, the Supreme Court
rarely intervened in matters of substantive patent law.181 That situation dramatically
changed after 1997, when the Supreme Court re-entered the world of patent law.182
One of the most significant interventions by the Supreme Court involved the law
of obviousness. In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,183 the Supreme Court
reviewed the law of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for the first time in over
thirty years.184 In doing so, it rejected the rather formalistic approach to the
obviousness inquiry that the Federal Circuit had developed.185
Prior to KSR, the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Graham v. John Deere
Co.186 provided the framework for analyzing the obviousness of an invention,
providing four factors to be considered: the scope and content of the prior art, the
differences between the prior art and the claimed invention, the level of ordinary
skill in the art, and any relevant secondary considerations, such as commercial
success, the failure of others, and long-felt but unsolved need.187 This determination
allows the combination of pieces of prior art, such as looking at a scientific article
and an earlier patent. If all of the “pieces” of the invention could be found in
various references, then likely the invention would be viewed as obvious. The
problem with such a construction, however, is that the patent application itself can
serve as a roadmap; it is much easier to find the pieces when the patent lays it all
out for the fact finder. Such hindsight reconstruction is problematic because, once
someone has created the invention, it may seem trivial and apparent after the

181. See Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 387.
182. See generally John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme
Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273; Timothy R. Holbrook, The Return of
the Supreme Court to Patent Law, 1 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Holbrook,
Supreme Court].
183. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
184. The last time the Supreme Court addressed the issue of obviousness was in 1973.
See Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976); see generally Holbrook, Complicity,
supra note 19, at 5–9 (cataloging pre-1995 Supreme Court cases reviewing Federal Circuit
judgments and noting a dearth of cases dealing with substantive patent law).
185. See Holbrook, Complicity, supra note 19, at 3; Thomas, supra note 19, at 773.
186. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
187. Id. at 17–18.
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fact.188 The inventive act may have been to make the combination of known
elements.189
Because of concern over this hindsight bias, the Federal Circuit began requiring
some reason that would be known to one of skill in the art to make the
combination.190 To be obvious, the prior art, the knowledge of the one skilled in the
art, or the nature of the problem must provide a teaching, suggestion, or motivation
(TSM) to combine relevant pieces to obtain the claimed invention.191 The Federal
Circuit had found an invention to be non-obvious, notwithstanding the presence of
each and every claim limitation in various pieces of prior art, simply because the
prior art lacked a motivation to combine those references.192 Many commentators
felt that the Federal Circuit effectively had lowered the standard of nonobviousness, resulting in the grant and enforcement of patents on trivial
innovations.193
The Supreme Court agreed with these critiques and rejected application of the
TSM in a rigid form.194 In so doing, the Supreme Court chastised the Federal
Circuit for emasculating the PHOSITA and provided a far more vigorous view of
her importance:
The second error of the Court of Appeals lay in its assumption that a
person of ordinary skill attempting to solve a problem will be led only
to those elements of prior art designed to solve the same problem. . . .
Common sense teaches, however, that familiar items may have obvious
uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of
ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents

188. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,194,299 (filed Dec. 31, 1986) (patent covering Post-It
Notes®); see generally Gregory N. Mandel, Another Missed Opportunity: The Supreme
Court’s Failure to Define Nonobviousness or Combat Hindsight Bias in KSR v. Teleflex, 12
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 323, 336−42 (2008) (discussing experimental studies and flaws in
the current obviousness inquiry); Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical
Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J.
1391 (2006) (performing experimental studies that show the presence of the hindsight bias in
assessing the obviousness of an invention).
189. See Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 357 F.3d 1270, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Timothy R.
Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119, 2160
(2008) [hereinafter Holbrook, Extraterritoriality].
190. In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
191. Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 999; Rouffet, 149 F.3d at 1357.
192. Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see
also Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 Fed. App’x 282, 286–90 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (reversing
summary judgment of invalidity based on misapplication of TSM analysis), rev’d, KSR Int’l
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
193. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 34–35
(2004); A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 89–90 (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C.
Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004); FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 6–7 (2003).
194. KSR, 550 U.S. at 419 (“But when a court transforms the general principle into a
rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry, as the Court of Appeals did here, it errs.”).
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together like pieces of a puzzle. . . . A person of ordinary skill is also a
person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.195
Commentators have noted the Supreme Court’s invigoration of the PHOSITA in
this context.196
The Supreme Court’s resuscitation of the PHOSITA suggests that the Court
disagrees with the Federal Circuit’s broader efforts to remove or minimize her
knowledge from other patent law doctrines.197 The Supreme Court nevertheless
missed an opportunity to provide a more structured framework to balance concerns
of notice with a role for the PHOSITA.198 As those before and after KSR have
suggested, one appropriate way of performing this balance is through the use of
presumptions.199 The Court need only look to its other patent law jurisprudence to
find a tool to permit appropriate balancing: the use of presumptions.

195. Id. at 420−21.
196. Darrow, supra note 7, at 248; Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic
Approach to the Obviousness of Inventions, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 999–1004 (2008);
Amy L. Landers, Ordinary Creativity in Patent Law: The Artist Within the Scientist, 75 MO.
L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2010); Joseph Scott Miller, Remixing Obviousness, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 237, 244 (2008); Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 3, at 134–35.
197. See Lee, supra note 4, at 42. Lee characterizes the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence as
taking a “holistic turn,” rejecting the Federal Circuit’s rules for more standard-like analyses.
Id. I agree with this only partially because early Supreme Court cases expressed the same
interest in certainty as the Federal Circuit. See Holbrook, Complicity, supra note 19, at 5–9.
Earlier cases articulated the use of presumptions to balance these interests, a methodology
the Court unfortunately has failed to embrace as of late. See infra notes 198−221 and
accompanying text.
198. Cf. Holbrook, Supreme Court, supra note 182, at 21. The Supreme Court’s more
recent pronouncements, while rejecting the Federal Circuit’s formalism, have failed to offer
much guidance as to their holistic approach. See Lee, supra note 4, at 63−64.
For example, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s bright-line rule
regarding patent exhaustion. Under the Federal Circuit’s prior law, only unrestricted sales of
the patented good exhausted the patentee’s exclusive rights; any limits on the right of the
purchaser on use of the invention resulted in a license, which did not exhaust the patent
rights. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 706–08 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The
Supreme Court rejected this rule, but offered little guidance as to when exhaustion is
triggered, noting only that “[t]he authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a
patent exhausts the patent holder’s rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking
patent law to control postsale use of the article.” Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008).
Similarly, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s rule for assessing subject
matter eligibility of a claimed process. The Federal Circuit required a process be “tied to a
particular machine or apparatus” or “transform[] a particular article into a different state or
thing.” In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). The Supreme Court noted that the “machine-ortransformation” test was helpful but was not the sole test; instead, it relied on vague notions
of the unpatentability of abstract ideas, natural phenomena, and laws of nature. Bilski, 130 S.
Ct. at 3227.
199. Brief for International Business Machines Corp. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Neither Party, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL
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In other patent-related cases, the Court has recognized the need for certainty but
has also counseled against overly harsh, formalistic rules.200 In the interest of
balancing certainty with fairness, the Court has articulated rebuttable presumptions
in a variety of contexts. In the context of prosecution history estoppel, the Court
has articulated two presumptions. Prosecution history estoppel is a legal limitation
on what is known as the doctrine of equivalents, which allows the patent to cover a
device that is not exactly the same as what is claimed but is “close enough.”201 An
exception to this coverage may arise if, during the prosecution of the patent
application at the USPTO, the applicant narrows a claim that would have covered
the asserted equivalent literally but, after the amendment, no longer does.202 The
Supreme Court has noted that “[b]y the amendment [the patentee] recognized and
emphasized the difference between the two phrases . . . . The difference which [the
patentee] thus disclaimed must be regarded as material.”203
In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,204 the Supreme Court
concluded that this estoppel only arises when an applicant amended the claims for a
reason related to patentability.205 The relevant prosecution history in the case,
however, was silent as to why the applicant amended the claim. In the situation
where the reason for the amendment is not known, the Court held that courts should
presume such amendments were made for reasons related to patentability.206 As the
Court reasoned:
The presumption we have described, one subject to rebuttal if an
appropriate reason for a required amendment is established, gives
proper deference to the role of claims in defining an invention and
providing public notice, and to the primacy of the PTO in ensuring that
the claims allowed cover only subject matter that is properly patentable
in a proffered patent application.207
In so doing, the Court rejected a more formalistic, clearer rule—that any
amendment created an estoppel.208 Instead, the Court created this presumption in
2430566, at *18 (arguing that “references should be presumed combinable by a person
having ordinary skill in the art where the references are within the scope of the ‘analogous
art’”; in such circumstances, there need not be a motivation to combine the references);
Timothy R. Holbrook, Commentary, Obviousness in Patent Law and the Motivation to
Combine: A Presumption-Based Approach, WASH. U. L. REV. SLIP OPINIONS (Mar. 21,
2007),
http://lawreview.wustl.edu/commentaries/obviousness-in-patent-law-and-themotivation-to-combine-a-presumption-based-approach; Miller, supra note 196, at 250−56;
Joshua D. Sarnoff, Bilcare, KSR, Presumptions of Validity, Preliminary Relief, and
Obviousness in Patent Law, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 995, 1000 (2008).
200. Cf. Holbrook, Supreme Court, supra note 182, at 9, 21−23.
201. See Holbrook, Paradox, supra note 11, at 14.
202. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733–34
(2002); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
203. Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136−37 (1942).
204. 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
205. Id. at 30−32.
206. Id. at 33.
207. Id. at 33−34.
208. Id. at 30 (“But petitioner reaches too far in arguing that the reason for an amendment
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order to demonstrate certain policy preferences—deference to the claims and
primacy of the PTO—but did not let those preferences result in absolute rules.
Those preferences instead are rebuttable in light of other concerns.
The Supreme Court followed up its presumption in Warner-Jenkinson with a
second in the context of prosecution history estoppel. In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,209 the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s
rule of prosecution history estoppel that absolutely precluded any equivalents if the
claim was narrowed for reasons related to patentability.210 In its place, recognizing
the need for certainty, the Supreme Court created a rebuttable presumption: by
making a narrowing amendment for reasons related to patentability, the applicant
presumptively has surrendered all equivalents.211 This presumption can be rebutted
if the asserted equivalent was unforeseeable, it bore only a tangential relationship to
the reason for the amendment, or there is some other reason that the applicant
should not be considered to have surrendered the equivalent.212 The Court
emphasized:
This presumption is not, then, just the complete bar by another name.
Rather, it reflects the fact that the interpretation of the patent must
begin with its literal claims, and the prosecution history is relevant to
construing those claims. When the patentee has chosen to narrow a
claim, courts may presume the amended text was composed with
awareness of this rule and that the territory surrendered is not an
equivalent of the territory claimed. In those instances, however, the
patentee still might rebut the presumption that estoppel bars a claim of
equivalence. The patentee must show that at the time of the amendment
one skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a
claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent.213
The Festo presumption, therefore, places primacy on the public record, with the
default being a complete surrender of equivalents due to the claim amendment.
Courts are only to diverge from that default if it is certain that the patent applicant
really did not surrender the equivalent, which does require departure from
considering solely the public record.214
A similar line of analysis is seen in a non-patent, yet patent-related, decision by
the Supreme Court. In TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,215 the
Supreme Court explored the intersection of patent and trademark law, specifically
reviewing whether the existence of a utility patent precluded the use of the design
of an article as source-identifying trade dress.216 Eschewing a bright-line rule that

during patent prosecution is irrelevant to any subsequent estoppel.”).
209. 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
210. Id. at 740.
211. Id. at 740−41.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 741.
214. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1369
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc).
215. 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
216. Id. at 29.
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would preclude trademark protection if the good was covered by a patent, the Court
instead created an evidentiary presumption:
A utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are
functional. If trade dress protection is sought for those features the
strong evidence of functionality based on the previous patent adds great
weight to the statutory presumption that features are deemed functional
until proved otherwise by the party seeking trade dress protection.
Where the expired patent claimed the features in question, one who
seeks to establish trade dress protection must carry the heavy burden of
showing that the feature is not functional, for instance by showing that
it is merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the
device.217
The use of this approach emphasizes the policy that the contents of an expired
patent generally are free to be copied by the public and thus ineligible for trade
dress protection.218 Nevertheless, there are occasions when affording trade dress
protection would be appropriate, notwithstanding the existence of the expired
utility patent, if the feature is nonfunctional and the design serves a sourceidentifying function.219 The use of the evidentiary presumption established the
policy preference—free competition and copying—which could be altered in light
of countervailing considerations.
Thus, the lessons of the Supreme Court have shown that (1) the PHOSITA is an
important consideration in patent law generally and (2) that the use of rebuttable
presumptions are an appropriate way to balance competing policy concerns.220 The

217. Id. at 29−30.
218. Id. at 29.
219. Id. at 29–30; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212–13
(2000) (noting that a product design can serve as a trademark if it is source-identifying); see
also In re Pennington Seed, Inc., 466 F.3d 1053, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (characterizing
TrafFix holding as a “rebuttable presumption” of functionality).
220. Professor Lee advocates a different methodology, drawing on patent law’s
enablement doctrine; Supreme Court decisions should enable any particular test or standard
articulated. See Lee, supra note 4, at 63−71. My thesis could be viewed as a narrower form
of this argument because a presumption-based approach seemingly would be enabling.
Overall, however, Professor Lee’s proposal has one serious flaw. Enablement in patent law
is based on the idea that the patent document is self-contained and self-referential—the
specification must explain how to make and use the invention contained within the patent
itself. A Supreme Court decision, and any rule articulated therein, must necessarily be of
general applicability because it must be applied to unforeseen future cases. It is difficult to
see how a singular Supreme Court decision could enable a court to readily decide a host of
future cases involving ever-evolving technologies. Thus, the Supreme Court would have to
write considerable dicta in order to guess what cases may come down the line. While
Professor Lee’s insights are commendable, the proposed prescription is a bit unsatisfying.
Another approach may be for the Supreme Court to take clusters of cases in a particular area
with different factual contexts to create greater certainty around legal standards. See Carolyn
Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian Court: Common Law Judging Versus Error Correction
in the Supreme Court, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271, 313–27 (2006). To be fair, Professor
Lee expressly disclaims offering any “substantive guidelines for determining when the

2011]

PATENTS, PRESUMPTIONS, AND PUBLIC NOTICE

815

presumption establishes a default norm, which here would be the importance of the
patent document and prosecution history. Only after a presumptive conclusion is
reached would expert testimony be considered to determine if it is persuasive
enough to overcome the intrinsic record. The use of the presumption, therefore,
would require consideration of extrinsic evidence, which typically is the manner by
which the views of the PHOSITA enter the calculus. The use of the presumption
may also act as a counterbalance to overreliance on expert testimony, one risk when
laypersons encounter technical information.221
B. The Theories of Presumptions and Their Applicability to Patent Law
The Supreme Court’s embrace of presumptions is quite fortuitous, even though
the Court did not engage in a theoretical account of the use of presumptions in
patent law, because they are an appropriate tool to balance the interest in notice
with consideration of the technical or scientific. This section explores the
theoretical basis for presumptions and explains why they are appropriate in the
realm of patent law.
Presumptions used in the law generally reflect social or policy choices that the
courts or legislatures want to emphasize.222 Commentators have identified a
number of reasons why the use of presumptions arise, including a reflection of the
probability of causation or to force a party to disclose information that it is more
likely to possess.223 In a sense, the presumption establishes a default position that
will stand absent the introduction of more information.
Presumptions, while ubiquitous in the law,224 vary widely in application.225
Indeed, the use of the term “presumption” has been inexact in the law.226 No single
rule is able to capture the entire universe of what courts and legislatures have
Supreme Court should intervene in patent affairs.” Lee, supra note 4, at 76. In contrast, the
proposals in this article do seek to offer such guidance to both the Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit.
221. See Lee, supra note 4, at 24−25.
222. See Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions in Civil Actions Reconsidered, 66 IOWA L. REV.
843, 845 (1981); Kenneth S. Broun, The Unfulfillable Promise of One Rule for All
Presumptions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 697, 702 (1984); Mason Ladd, Presumptions in Civil Actions,
1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 279; cf. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189,
209 (1973) (“This burden-shifting principle is not new or novel. There are no hard-and-fast
standards governing the allocation of the burden of proof in every situation. The issue,
rather, ‘is merely a question of policy and fairness based on experience in the different
situations.’” (quoting 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2486, at 275 (3d ed. 1940))).
223. See Allen, supra note 222, at 845 (“[Presumptions] have been used to construct rules
of decision to avoid factual impasse at trial; to allocate burdens of persuasion; to instruct the
jury on the relationship between facts; and to allocate burdens of production.”); Ladd, supra
note 222, at 280−81.
224. Antonio E. Bernardo, Eric Talley & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Legal Presumptions, 16
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 2 (2000).
225. See Ladd, supra note 222, at 277 (“Courts and legislatures often carelessly use the
term ‘presumption.’”); see also Broun, supra note 222, at 703 (exploring “bursting bubble”
presumptions versus presumptions that shift the burden of proof).
226. Professor Allen advocated for eliminating the use of the term “presumption.” Allen,
supra note 222, at 864.
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dubbed “presumptions.”227 For example, issued patents are presumed valid,228 but
this presumption merely establishes that the accused infringer bears the burden of
proving invalidity as an affirmative defense.229 Thus, the use of the term
presumption does little work, as it simply defines invalidity as an affirmative
defense.230
In other contexts, the term “presumption” is used to describe the shift of the
burden of proof only if certain factual predicates can be demonstrated. The tort
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, for instance, permits a jury to presume the negligence
of the defendant if the plaintiff can show that
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of negligence;
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and
third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant’s duty
to the plaintiff.231

227. Broun, supra note 222, at 697−98. Part of the problem with finding a uniform rule is
that various policy concerns reflected in the presumption may need to be treated differently
given the context, creating variations in the ways in which presumptions function. Id. at 708.
228. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
229. Allen, supra note 222, at 849−50 (objecting to use of term “presumption” in this
context). Not all courts agreed with this view of the presumption of validity, however.
Before the Federal Circuit was created, some courts treated the presumption of validity as
merely shifting the burden of production to the defendant and, once that burden was
satisfied, the presumption of validity disappeared under a “bursting bubble” approach. See
Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 713 (6th Cir. 1975) (“The issuance
of letters by the Patent Office, because of the statutory presumption of validity, makes a
prima facie case for a plaintiff asserting the validity of his patent. This presumption has no
independent evidentiary value, however, but only serves to place the burden of proof on a
party who asserts invalidity. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Del Vecchio v. Bowers,
296 U.S. 280 (1935), a statutory presumption ‘falls out of a case’ when the party against
whom the presumption works meets his burden of offering evidence sufficient to justify a
contrary finding.” (citation omitted) (emphasis in original)); Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions,
Inferences and Burden of Proof in Federal Civil Actions—An Anatomy of Unnecessary
Ambiguity and a Proposal for Reform, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 892, 897 n.26 (1982)
(characterizing Sperberg as dealing with burden of production).
230. The Federal Circuit has used the statutory presumption to require proof of invalidity
by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Iovate Health Scis., Inc. v. Bio-Engineered
Supplements & Nutrition, Inc., 586 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009). But see generally
Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60
STAN. L. REV. 45 (2007) (arguing that the clear and convincing standard is not appropriate if
the asserted prior art was not before the PTO). The Supreme Court will address this issue in
the October 2010 term. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., No. 10-290, 2010 WL 3392402 (U.S.
Nov. 29, 2010). The question presented is “[w]hether the court of appeals erred in holding
that Microsoft’s invalidity defense must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.”
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., No. 10-290 (U.S. Aug. 27,
2010), 2010 WL 3413088, at *ii.
231. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965); see also Gideon Parchomovsky &
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Patent law has a similar burden-shifting provision, dealing with the proof of
infringement for patented processes.232 If the patent holder can demonstrate both
that “a substantial likelihood exists that the product was made by the patented
process” and “that the plaintiff has made a reasonable effort to determine the
process actually used in the production of the product and was unable to so
determine,” then the burden shifts to the accused infringer to prove the product was
not produced by the patented process.233 In these circumstances, the presumption
acts as a tool to force the party who is in the better position to have the relevant
information to divulge it.234 In the patent context, the accused infringer will know
what process it utilizes more readily than the patentee, particularly if that process is
performed overseas,235 limiting the patentee’s ability to obtain discovery. These
presumptions can result in a shifting of the entire burden of proof (including both
the burden of production and persuasion) or only one aspect (typically the burden
of production).
Presumptions may not need to even shift these evidentiary burdens to have the
effect of eliciting more information. The presumption-like framework in TrafFix
does not change the burden in any sense because the trademark owner at all times
bears the burden of proving the validity of the trade dress; nevertheless, if the
accused infringer can demonstrate the existence of a utility patent, the party
asserting the trade dress must come forward with additional evidence to
demonstrate that the design is nonfunctional.236 The prosecution history
Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV. 285, 286−87 (2008) (referring to res
ipsa loquitur as a presumption); see generally David Kaye, Probability Theory Meets Res
Ipsa Loquitur, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1456 (1979). There is variation among the states as to
whether the presumption of the res ipsa rule is permissive, allowing the jury to find
negligence, or mandatory, shifting the burden of production to the defendant. See Broun,
supra note 222, at 699.
232. See 35 U.S.C. § 295 (2006). This burden shifting appears to be a mandatory
presumption.
233. Id. This presumption is required by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS), although the U.S. statutory provision permissibly differs from
the TRIPS article. TRIPS Article 34 permits the burden shift if either the product of the
process is new or “if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by
the process and the owner of the patent has been unable through reasonable efforts to
determine the process actually used.” Article 34 only requires signatories to adopt one of
these conditions, and the United States has adopted only the latter. Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art. 34, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999),
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (“Members shall
provide, in at least one of the following circumstances, that any identical product when
produced without the consent of the patent owner shall, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, be deemed to have been obtained by the patented process.” (emphasis added)).
234. Cf. Ladd, supra note 222, at 281.
235. Such a scenario can arise because it is an act of infringement to import the product
of a patented process, even if the process is performed overseas. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2006);
see Holbrook, Extraterritoriality, supra note 189, at 2139−41, 2148−50.
236. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 30 (2001); see, e.g.,
Great Neck Saw Mfrs., Inc. v. Star Asia U.S.A., LLC, No. C06-647Z, 2010 WL 2949296, at
*16 (W.D. Wash. July 23, 2010).
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presumptions play a similar, information-forcing role. Although the patent holder at
all times bears the burden of proving infringement, the Warner-Jenkinson and
Festo presumptions require the patentee to produce additional evidence in order to
rebut them.237 In these contexts, the presumption operates as a litigation-based
information forcing tool.238
Thus, in the patent context, two key aspects of presumptions are important. The
first is using the presumption to implement a policy choice: the default position is
often determined through consideration of a policy preference that the courts or the
legislatures want to implement.239 In patent law, both the Federal Circuit and the
Supreme Court have noted that the important policy of public notice is served by
favoring the publicly available intrinsic evidence.240 This choice reflects the interest
in certainty that is important to the proper functioning of any property regime.
Thus, reliance on the intrinsic evidence should create a presumptive conclusion.
The conclusion reached from consideration of the intrinsic evidence, however, can
be rebutted through consideration of extrinsic, technical information. The
presumption, therefore, not only works to effect public notice and certainty but also
ensures a modicum of flexibility.
The second reason why presumptions are appropriate in the context of the
treatment of the patent document is the information-forcing function they create.
Patent applicants do have incentives to withhold certain information and behave
strategically, in part due to concerns over competition and in part due to concerns
over the legal consequences their disclosures may create.241 As to the former, patent
applicants have the incentive to disclose “just enough” to satisfy the patentability
requirements of § 112 while retaining other aspects as trade secrets.242 As to the
latter, the Federal Circuit’s treatment of the patent document gives an incentive for
patent applicants to limit their disclosures to avoid potential estoppel-like
consequences. Of course, the court’s written description and enablement
jurisprudence put applicants in a bit of a catch-22: you must disclose even that
which the PHOSITA knows, yet overdisclosure risks surrendering claim scope
during the claim construction process. Nevertheless, given that the patentee is more
likely to have information relevant to an understanding of the patent document, the

237. One could frame these scenarios more concretely in terms of a presumption
framework. Under TrafFix, the accused infringer could be viewed as having the burden of
producing the utility patent and showing that the asserted trade dress is covered by the
patent; the burden of production then shifts back to the trademark owner. Similarly, the
accused infringer bears the burden of producing evidence that a narrowing amendment was
made during prosecution of the relevant patent. The burden of production then shifts to the
patent holder to show that the amendment was made for a reason unrelated to patentability,
that the amendment bore only a tangential relationship to the asserted equivalent, or that the
equivalent was unforeseeable.
238. Allen, supra note 222, at 860.
239. See Broun, supra note 222, at 702.
240. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 727 (2002);
Warner-Jenkinson Co., v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29–30 (1997); Vitronics
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
241. See supra notes 163–66 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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use of presumptions to create defaults can force the patentee to divulge additional
information to the court or risk the loss of patent scope or the invalidation of the
patent claim.
C. The Use of Rebuttable Presumptions Can Help Balance the
Legal and Technical Nature of the Patent Document
Generally presumptions can be used to establish a default position that can be
shifted in light of additional evidence. In the context of patent law, that preference
is to emphasize the primacy of the patent document and the prosecution history, the
intrinsic evidence.243 Determinations of claim construction or the sufficiency of the
patent’s disclosure should, in the main, be determined by that primarily legal
evidence. That default position, however, can be altered by consideration of
extrinsic evidence, which can explain the technical component. The following
subsection advocates and elaborates the use of presumptions in claim construction,
written description, and enablement law.
1. Intrinsic Evidence in Claim Construction Should Create a
Presumptive Interpretation, Rebuttable by the Extrinsic Evidence
The lessons of the Supreme Court’s decisions, and the theoretical justifications
of presumptions as promoting certain norms and policies, shows that the Federal
Circuit has gone too far in its claim construction jurisprudence. Under the current
regime, claim construction operates in a manner akin to the absolute bar approach
to prosecution history estoppel rejected by the Supreme Court in Festo.244 As the
Federal Circuit stated in Vitronics, reliance on the extrinsic evidence is
inappropriate if the intrinsic evidence is unambiguous.245 In other words, the
extrinsic evidence cannot be used to contradict the clear teachings of the intrinsic
evidence. If the intrinsic evidence generates a certain meaning to the claim term,
that definition governs regardless of what the extrinsic evidence may suggest.
This methodology is in essence an irrebuttable presumption, akin to the absolute
bar of prosecution history estoppel that the Supreme Court rejected. The most
appropriate time to consider the extrinsic evidence, contrary to Vitronics, would be
when it truly conflicts or is in tension with the intrinsic evidence because it
suggests a technologist might read the language differently than a lawyer. The
elevation of the patent document is a bit surprising in that the court appears to
assume that the patent applicant has somehow perfectly described or represented
the nature of the invention.246 Such an assumption is flawed on a number of levels.

243. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
244. See Festo, 535 U.S. at 737.
245. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583; see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324 (“In Vitronics, we did
not attempt to provide a rigid algorithm for claim construction, but simply attempted to
explain why, in general, certain types of evidence are more valuable than others. Today, we
adhere to that approach and reaffirm the approach to claim construction outlined in that
case . . . .”).
246. Cf. Festo, 535 U.S. at 738 (“It does not follow, however, that the amended claim
becomes so perfect in its description that no one could devise an equivalent. After
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To begin, there is no requirement for the inventor to actually be ordinarily skilled in
the art: she could be over- or under-skilled. Thus assuming the PHOSITA would
take the specification as scientifically accurate seems incorrect.247 The PHOSITA
could read language of surrender far differently from a scientific perspective than a
legal one because she might recognize technical errors in the disclosure or might
weigh the importance of the disclosure differently.248 The patent applicant can even
be wrong about why the invention works, so long as she nevertheless teaches how
to make and use it.249 Thus, as a technological matter, there is no reason to assume
that the disclosure should be the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of the claim.
Instead, the intrinsic evidence should create a presumptive interpretation,
rebuttable by extrinsic evidence.250 This would play out in practice by focusing on
the burden of proof. As the burden of proof lies with the patentee in proving
infringement, the burden of persuasion at all times would remain with the patentee.
If the intrinsic evidence supports the patentee’s interpretation, the burden of
production would shift to the accused infringer to produce extrinsic evidence to
contradict the construction afforded the claim from the intrinsic evidence. Absent
any such evidence, the claim construction would stand. If the accused infringer
came forward with such evidence, the patentee would need to come forward with
her own extrinsic evidence to carry the burden of persuasion.251
amendment, as before, language remains an imperfect fit for invention.”).
247. Cf. Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim
Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 333, 367−68 (2007) (arguing that reliance on intrinsic
evidence alone risks reducing notice and certainty because of lack of technical context).
248. See, e.g., Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 1377, 1382
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[T]he extrinsic evidence invoked by PowerTrax to show a potential issue
of fact relating to the importance of the reliability issue does not trump the clear disclosures
and assertions in the patent itself.”); Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int’l, Inc., 141
F.3d 1084, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“This new and absolute rule is
presented by the majority as rendering irrelevant any evidence of insubstantiality of the
differences, or sameness of function/way/result, with reference to the function described in
claim clause [5] . . . . The importance of a property mentioned in the specification is a fact to
be found and weighed. It is improper to foreclose such evidence by ruling that every
unclaimed advantage must be present, whatever its relative significance in practice.”).
249. Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consol. Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 435−36 (1911) (“It
is certainly not necessary that he understand or be able to state the scientific principles
underlying his invention, and it is immaterial whether he can stand a successful examination
as to the speculative ideas involved.”); Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581−82 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (“While it is not a requirement of patentability that an inventor correctly set forth,
or even know, how or why the invention works, neither is the patent applicant relieved of the
requirement of teaching how to achieve the claimed result, even if the theory of operation is
not correctly explained or even understood.” (citations omitted)).
250. The use of extrinsic evidence could elevate the role of expert testimony in claim
construction prepared in anticipation of litigation and the concern of “hired guns” that do not
help elucidate the meaning of the claims. See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318; Vitronics, 90
F.3d at 1585. As the Supreme Court noted, however, in most cases, credibility and other
concerns with experts should be subsumed in the entirety of the claim construction process.
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389 (1996). Moreover, if the expert
testimony is in equipoise or otherwise unclear, than the presumptive interpretation afforded
by the intrinsic evidence would control, mitigating this concern.
251. Importantly, this approach also differs from contract interpretation, which has been
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On the other hand, if the intrinsic evidence supported the construction offered by
the accused infringer, then the patentee would have both the burden of production
and persuasion of providing extrinsic evidence contradicting the interpretation
provided by the intrinsic evidence. As the burden of proof remains with the
patentee, the accused infringer theoretically could stand on the intrinsic evidence
alone, although such reliance as a strategic matter would be ill-advised.
There may be occasions when a patent applicant wants to guarantee a particular
definition or meaning for a term contained with the patent. In such a circumstance,
the applicant should act as a lexicographer and provide an explicit definition for the
term.252 By providing an express definition, this would inform both a lawyer and a
technologist as to what the term means, limiting the inquiry to that definition alone.
In contrast, courts would no longer be permitted to use implicit definitions through
disavowals to narrow claim scope without first considering whether a technologist
would view such language in the specification or prosecution history as disclaiming
the relevant subject matter.253
The Federal Circuit has articulated a variety of “presumptions” in the context of
claim construction. For example, claims that use different language are
presumptively of different scope.254 Similarly, the use of the term “means” in a
claim creates a presumption that the applicant intends to evoke “means-plusfunction” claiming as governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6;255 conversely, failure to
use the term “means” creates a presumption against interpreting the claim as a
“means-plus-function” claim.256
These presumptions, however, are not the same type as those articulated in this
article. Use of these presumptions is a bit perplexing. Presumptions are helpful in
giving preference to certain types of evidence, which reflects certain normative or

advanced as an appropriate analogy to claim construction. See Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 997–98 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, J., concurring) (arguing for
contract-like analysis, with intrinsic evidence treated as legal and extrinsic evidence as
factual), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). In contract interpretation, resort to parole evidence is
appropriate only if the contract language itself is ambiguous. See, e.g., Thomsen v. Famous
Dave’s of Am., Inc., 606 F.3d 905, 908 (8th Cir. 2010) (applying Minnesota law); Addicks
Services, Inc. v. GGP-Bridgeland, LP, 596 F.3d 286, 294 (5th Cir. 2010) (applying Texas
law). In claim interpretation, however, more than the patent applicant’s intent is relevant;
instead, it is that of the exogenous, objective PHOSITA. Thus, the contract analogy also
fails.
252. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (“[O]ur cases recognize that the specification may
reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning
it would otherwise possess. In such cases, the inventor’s lexicography governs.”); Markman,
52 F.3d at 980 (“As we have often stated, a patentee is free to be his own lexicographer.”);
cf. Miller, supra note 44, at 203–07 (advocating requiring lexicon and preferred dictionary
sections in patents to guide definitions).
253. See supra notes 72–78 and accompanying text.
254. This canon of claim construction is known as claim differentiation. See CurtissWright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(discussing doctrine’s applicability to not only independent and dependent claims but also to
two independent claims).
255. See, e.g., Welker Bearing Co. v. PHD, Inc., 550 F.3d 1090, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
256. E.g., CCS Fitness v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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policy preferences.257 In the above examples, the only evidence that is relevant in
assessing these presumptions is the intrinsic evidence—the patent itself. Indeed, it
seems strange to speak of these presumptions in an inquiry that is entirely a legal
analysis.258 While arguably these presumptions might create a hierarchy as to which
part of the intrinsic evidence is more relevant, ultimately the court will decide what
the intrinsic evidence means. Even the court has recognized that these
presumptions are more “rules of thumb” as opposed to presumptions that help
govern the relevancy and weight of other evidence, such as how to appropriately
weigh the intrinsic versus the extrinsic evidence.259 Thus, these various
presumptions in the canons of claim construction are a bit perplexing and really do
not appear to be true “presumptions” in the evidentiary sense.
One corollary to the use of presumptions in claim construction is that it
undermines the current status of claim construction as purely legal. Courts are in
the business of construing legal documents but not technical ones. These
technological considerations, and the presumptions surrounding them, would
inevitably be factual in nature, suggesting that the current regime of de novo review
of claim construction would need to be rejected.260
2. A Disclosure of a Limited Number of Species or a Teaching Away
Should Create a Presumption of Failure of Written Description or Enablement,
Rebuttable by Extrinsic Evidence
In a manner akin to claim construction, the Federal Circuit has essentially
foreclosed consideration of the views of the PHOSITA from assessing the
adequacy of a patent’s disclosure under both the written description and
enablement inquiries. Aside from being inconsistent with the clear language of
§ 112,261 it creates significant costs to patent drafters to include information that the
PHOSITA would know and places them in the odd position of attempting to guess
what future litigants may use against them.

257. See Broun, supra note 222, at 702.
258. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454−56 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc).
259. Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(“[C]laim differentiation is a rule of thumb that does not trump the clear import of the
specification.”); see also Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 404 (Ct. Cl.
1967) (“Claim differentiation is a guide, not a rigid rule. If a claim will bear only one
interpretation, similarity will have to be tolerated.”); accord ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med.
Sys., Inc., 558 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009); NOMOS Corp. v. BrainLAB USA, Inc.,
357 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
260. While there is considerable support for this move, even at the Federal Circuit, it is
unclear as a constitutional matter how the court could do so. The Supreme Court, in
agreement with the Federal Circuit, removed the jury from the act of claim construction by
treating the issue as “purely legal.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,
391 (1996). It is unclear how the courts could then remove the jury from claim construction,
yet afford deference to fact finding relevant to claim construction on appeal.
261. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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Instead of using the patent disclosure exclusively, the court should establish
presumptions based on the disclosure, subject to rebuttal by extrinsic evidence.262
Consultation of the specification would create a presumption that disclosure is
insufficient, subject to rebuttal by extrinsic evidence. Of course, the posture of
written description and enablement challenges in the court is strikingly different
than issues of claim construction because the accused infringer bears the burden of
proving the claim is invalid.263 As a result, the Federal Circuit’s reliance
exclusively on the patent disclosure alone in these cases is particularly troublesome
given that the Patent Office has reviewed the disclosure and found it sufficient,
which is the reason for the statutory presumption.264
A presumption-based methodology can take into account the statutory
presumption of validity, as can be seen from the Federal Circuit’s approach for
assessing whether a party other than the patentee was the first to invent under 35
U.S.C. § 102(g)(2).265 Generally, under U.S. patent law, the first person to invent is
entitled to a patent; the exception, however, is if that person abandoned,
suppressed, or concealed it.266 In those circumstances, then the second-to-invent
can be awarded the patent.267 In the litigation context, this issue arises when an
accused infringer challenges the validity of the patent by asserting that someone
else was the first to invent (often times the accused infringer herself).268 The
patentee’s response is often that the alleged first to invent abandoned, suppressed,
or concealed the invention, negating their status as the first to invent and preserving
the validity of the patent.269 In order to sort out these various positions and to

262. Professor Seymore has offered a slightly different burden-shifting methodology for
use in the USPTO. See Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 3, at 156−57. His
proposal and this framework could complement each other, with mine focused on the
litigation context and his the prosecution context. The PTO does currently use a variant of
burden shifting when assessing the sufficiency of a patent application, although the initial
burden lies on the examiner, not the applicant, to demonstrate a prima facie case of lack of
written description or enablement. See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Professor Seymore would shift this burden if the applicant has failed to provide a working
example.
263. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
264. Of course, the Patent Office is not well-situated to evaluate the scope of disclosures,
particularly enablement, as it has no ability to experiment or “try out” the invention. See
Fromer, Patent Disclosure, supra note 3, at 579−80; Seymore, Patently Impossible, supra
note 141, at 18−19 (both discussing the limits on the PTO’s ability to assess disclosure). The
disclosure in the patent application is presumed sufficient, and it is incumbent on the
examiner to provide a basis to challenge the application’s sufficiency. See In re Doyle, 482
F.2d 1385, 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973); see generally Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 230, at 53–
56 (noting difficulties examiners have in adequately reviewing patent applications).
265. See Apotex USA, Inc. v. Merck & Co., 254 F.3d 1031, 1037–38 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
266. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2006).
267. See Lutzker v. Plet, 843 F.2d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
268. See, e.g., Apotex, 254 F.3d at 1035–36.
269. See, e.g., id. at 1036 (arguing that Apotex’s patent is not invalid because, although
Merck was the first-to-invent, it suppressed the invention); cf. Young v. Dworkin, 489 F.2d
1277, 1281–82 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (awarding patent to the second-to-invent because the firstto-invent suppressed the invention).
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account for the presumption of validity that attends an issued patent, the Federal
Circuit articulated the following presumption-based framework:
[O]nce a challenger of a patent has proven by clear and convincing
evidence that “the invention was made in this country by another
inventor,” 35 U.S.C. § 102(g), the burden of production shifts to the
patentee to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the prior inventor has suppressed or
concealed the invention. However, in accordance with the statutory
presumption in 35 U.S.C. § 282, the ultimate burden of persuasion
remains with the party challenging the validity of the patent. Once the
patentee has satisfied its burden of production, the party alleging
invalidity under § 102(g) must rebut any alleged suppression or
concealment with clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.270
In the context of assessing the sufficiency of the patent’s disclosure, a
presumption approach could work similarly. If the court considers the specification
to be inadequate, then the burden of coming forward would shift to the patentee to
produce evidence to create a genuine issue regarding the sufficiency of the patent’s
disclosure. The ultimate burden of proving the patent claim invalid for lack of
written description or enablement would remain with the accused infringer. On the
other hand, if the court views the specification as adequate, then the accused
infringer would be presented with the daunting task of demonstrating that the
extrinsic evidence shows the inadequacy of the disclosure. In this scenario, the
presumption would buttress the presumption of validity, making demonstration of
invalidity rather difficult. The patentee would have no obligation to come forward
with any additional evidence. It would be a rare case where the party challenging
the patent’s validity would be successful if the patent document alone is viewed as
sufficient.
The presumption expresses the norm in favor of disclosures and the public
record but allows supplementation of evidence of the PHOSITA. This approach
seems particularly appropriate given the hindsight advantage that subsequent
readers of a patent might have. Patentees would not be entirely handcuffed by
disclosures made years before, particularly if the PHOSITA at the time would have
had such knowledge within her grasp.
With respect to the written description requirement, for a broad generic claim,
the failure to disclose multiple species or other functional considerations that would
teach that one could extrapolate readily from a narrower disclosure would create a
presumption that the disclosure has not placed the public in possession of the
invention. At that point, the court would consider evidence of the knowledge of the
PHOSITA to determine if the representations made in the specification are accurate
as a technological matter.
A similar analysis would apply in the enablement context. Indeed, the Federal
Circuit in Liebel-Flarsheim271 came close to adopting this approach. There, the
specification taught away from a particular embodiment (which of course was the

270. Apotex, 254 F.3d at 1037−38 (citations omitted).
271. 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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accused device).272 The court then also considered extrinsic evidence to determine
whether the claims were enabled.273 In essence, the court was using a presumptionlike framework: the specification contained a teaching away from a given
embodiment, creating a presumption that the full scope of the claim was not
enabled. Consultation of extrinsic evidence confirmed that the claim was not fully
enabled.274 Although the court did not use the language of presumptions, the
methodology used in Liebel-Flarsheim demonstrates how such a presumption could
work. Instead, however, the Federal Circuit’s law evolved into the written
description-like approaches of Automotive Technologies, Sitrick, and ALZA, which
inappropriately discount extrinsic evidence.
D. Possible Disadvantages of the Presumption-Based Approach
The proposed presumption-based methodology affords a way of balancing the
interest in certainty and notice provided by giving primacy to the patent document,
while providing a safety valve through the necessary admission of extrinsic
evidence to ensure that the patent is given its appropriate, technological import.
This approach depends, of course, on the courts actually respecting the method.
One potential outcome is that the courts would articulate such presumptions yet
never find the extrinsic evidence compelling enough to rebut the clear teachings of
the patent. Given the tendency for people to rely on heuristics when engaging
technological information, such an intuition may flow naturally. Moreover, to the
extent that the Federal Circuit would seek to retain control over doctrine, it may be
reticent to relinquish some of its power of review on appeal.275
Nevertheless, the presumption-based approach would require the courts to
readily consider the technological evidence in lieu of simply precluding it. The
process of analyzing the evidence hopefully would add greater transparency to the
judicial process and force the courts to engage with the relevant technological facts.
CONCLUSION
The public notice function of patents is undeniably important. The Federal
Circuit’s preoccupation with this function, therefore, is entirely understandable.
Unfortunately, the methodology that they have used in the context of claim
construction, written description, and enablement, is flawed because it fails to
adequately account for the technical aspect of the patent document and how that
knowledge can impact the meaning of the terms contained therein. The use of
presumptions, as advocated in this Article, provides a reasonable manner to balance
the interest in certainty afforded by the intrinsic evidence with considerations of the
technical. Those in the “real world,” and not in litigation, would avail themselves
of this information, which the Federal Circuit’s current approach generally ignores,

272. Id. at 1380.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1382.
275. Seemingly much of the admitted extrinsic evidence would be factual in nature,
requiring deference on appeal, whereas the intrinsic evidence would be reviewed de novo.
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to the detriment of the patent system.276 In this way, the technical aspect of the
patent is preserved and recognized, while giving an appropriate level of deference
to the publicly available information.

276. Cf. Mullally, supra note 247, at 368−69.

